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Today’s Forest Service is increasingly more cognizant of the non-extractive uses and 
values of national forests, and under the current regime of “ecosystem management,” 
seeks to integrate biological and human uses of natural resources in order to allow 
resource extraction while minimizing loss of biodiversity. A primary component o f 
ecosystem management is analyzing the effects of management activities on a variety 
of scales, including landscape, watershed, and project levels, tlrrough species surveys 
and monitoring. It follows that establishing an ecological baseline prior to any 
management activity is essential to analysis of the actual effects of that activity and to 
determining the probable consequences of such activities in the future.
Federal recognition of the importance of surveying and monitoring is now embodied 
in national environmental acts governing public lands and their implementing 
regulations, as well as within each forest’s individual land and resource management 
plan, all of which require collection and consideration of this information. However, 
environmentalists and federal cases suggest that the Forest Service, and other federal 
land management agencies, frequently ignore or inadequately perform these 
requirements. While enforcement of these regulations cannot insure the Agency will 
make the most environmentally sound decision in each instance, it makes it more 
likely, and provides environmental plaintiffs grounds on which to challenge poor and 
unsupportable decisions.
Numerous judicial challenges attempting to force the Forest Service to adequately 
perform the species surveying and monitoring requirements contained in federal 
enviromnental laws and individual forest plans have turned primarily on the 
application of two legal concepts. First, the judicial doctrine of ripeness and the 
associated requirement of final agency action governs the point at which a court may 
decide a controversy. Second, the concept of agency discretion determines the degree 
to which a court must defer to a land management agency’s scientific expertise and its 
interpretation of its regulations. While the success of the these challenges in federal 
courts has been inconsistent, this paper argues that judicial enforcement o f monitoring 
requirements against federal land management agencies is proper, and remains a 
legally viable method to ensure that federal agencies make fully informed resource 
development decisions that consider and protect habitat, species, and biodiversity on 
our public lands.
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1. Introduction
In the wake o f World War II, the United States Forest Service became the 
principal supplier o f an enormous demand for timber.' One result o f the Agency’s focus 
on timber harvest was an unprecedented decline in the diversity o f plant and animal life 
within national forests,^ This decline is primarily due to the destruction of habitat 
resulting from timber harvest and the Forest Service’s attempt to meet its dual mandates 
of production and preservation through intensive management activities.^ In addition to 
the inherent existence value o f individual species, scientists realize the importance of 
maintaining biodiversity since they do not fully understand the role o f each species in -  
or its importance to — the ecosystem as a whole.'* Over 50 years ago, Aldo Leopold 
recognized the need to maintain biodiversity when he noted that the first rule o f the 
tinkerer is to keep all o f the pieces.^
Today’s Forest Service is increasingly more cognizant o f the non-extractive uses 
and values of national forests, and under the current regime of “ecosystem management,’’ 
seeks to integrate biological and human uses o f natural resources in order to allow
' Harvest levels on federal forests increased 800% (from 1.5 to 11.5 billion board feet per year) between  
1947 and 1971. David W. Crumpacker, P rospects fo r  Sustainability o f  B iodiversity B ased on Conservation  
B iology an d  U.S. F orest Service A pproaches to Ecosystem  M anagement, 40 LANDSCAPE AND URBAN  
P l a n n in g  47, 58 (1998); an d  see  generally  Paul W . Hirt, A  CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: M a n a g e m e n t  o f  
THE N a t io n a l  F o r e s t s  s i n c e  W o r l d  W a r  T w o , (University o f  Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1994), and  
Charles F, W ilkinson and M ichael H. Anderson, L a n d  AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE N a t io n a l  
F o r e s t s , (Island Press, 1987).
 ̂Id. ; and see  generally  Edward O. W ilson, THE DIVERSITY OF L i f e , 259 ( 1992).
 ̂W ilson, supra  note 2 at 253-54; D avid S. W ilcove et al.. Quantifying Threats to Im periled Species in the 
U nited States, 48 B IO SC IEN C E 607, 609 (1998). In Federal Register notices, habitat loss is almost 
invariably cited as one o f  the primary reason for determinations o f  threatened status o f  various species 
under the Endangered Species Act.
“ See generally. C r e a t in g  a  F o r e s t r y  f o r  THE 2U ^ CENTURY: THE SCIENCE OF ECOSYSTEM  
M a n a g e m e n t , Kathryn A. Kohm  & Jerry F. Franklin, eds. (1997).
 ̂A ldo Leopold, A  S a n d  COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (N ew  York: Oxford 
University Press, 1949).
1
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resource extraction while minimizing loss of biodiversity.^ A primary component of 
ecosystem management is analyzing the effects of management activities on a variety of 
scales, including landscape, watershed, and project levels, through species surveys and 
monitoring.^ It follows that establishing an ecological baseline prior to any management 
activity is essential to analysis o f the actual effects of that activity and to determining the 
probable consequences o f such activities in the future.
Federal recognition of the importance of surveying and monitoring is now 
embodied in national environmental acts governing public lands and their implementing 
regulations, as well as within each forest’s individual land and resource management plan 
(LRMP), all of which require collection and consideration of this information. However, 
environmentalists and the cases discussed below suggest that the Forest Service, and 
other federal land management agencies, frequently ignore or inadequately perform these 
requirements.* While enforcement of these regulations cannot insure the Agency will 
make the most environmentally sound decision in each instance, it makes it more likely, 
and provides environmental plaintiffs grounds on which to challenge poor and 
unsupportable decisions.
Numerous judicial challenges attempting to force the Forest Service to adequately
* Peter F. Brussard et al., Ecosystem Management: What is it Really?^ 40 L a n d s c a p e  a n d  U r b a n  
P l a n n in g  9, 10 (1998).
’ Forest Ecosystem Management Assessm ent Team, F o r e s t  E c o s y s t e m  M a n a g e m e n t : A n  E c o l o g ic a l , 
E c o n o m ic , a n d  So c ia l  A s s e s s m e n t , VIII-14 (1993); see also  W illiam T. Secton & Robert C. Szaro, 
Implementing Ecosystem M anagement: Using M ultiple Boundaries fo r  Organizing Information, 40  
L a n d s c a p e  a n d  URBAN P l a n n in g  1 6 7 ,1 6 9 (1 9 9 8 ).
* Interview with Jeff Juel o f  the Ecology Center, December 6, 2000 (indicating that the monitoring in most 
Region I forests is inadequate at best, and noting that under the current state o f  the law in this Circuit, 
environmental groups are required to mount multiple timber-sale-specific challenges to inadequate 
monitoring; which are expensive, time-consuming, and beyond the resources o f  most enviromnental 
groups).
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perform the species surveying and monitoring requirements contained in federal 
environmental laws and individual forest plans have turned primarily on the application 
o f two legal concepts. First, the judicial doctrine of ripeness and the associated 
requirement of final agency action governs the point at which a court may decide a 
controversy. Second, the concept o f agency discretion determines the degree to which a 
court must defer to a land management agency’s scientific expertise and its interpretation 
o f its regulations. While the success of the these challenges in federal courts has been 
inconsistent, this paper argues that judicial enforcement of monitoring requirements 
against federal land management agencies is proper, and remains a legally viable method 
to ensure that federal agencies make fully informed resource development decisions that 
consider and protect habitat, species, and biodiversity on our public lands.
Section two of this paper provides background on monitoring requirements, 
discussing the science and policy behind them, and the statutory framework out o f which 
they arise and in which they operate. The third section discusses the primary procedural 
barrier to the judicial enforcement of monitoring requirements, the doctrine of ripeness 
and the requirement o f final agency action, as applied by the United States Supreme 
Court in a recent challenge to the substance of a forest plan. Section three also examines 
the facts, issues and holdings of recent cases involving judicial challenges to inadequate 
monitoring by federal land management agencies. In section four, this paper addresses 
the concept o f agency deference, which has emerged as the primary substantive grounds 
for some courts’ refusal to strictly enforce monitoring requirements. This section also 
examines how the standard of review was applied in recent federal cases involving Forest 
Service failures to monitor. Finally, this paper concludes that the better reasoned federal
3
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court decisions hold that challenges to agency noncompliance with species monitoring 
requirements are ripe for judicial review as final agency actions or failures to act; and that 
while an agency is entitled to deference in interpreting and carrying out these regulations, 
an agency’s failure to collect the required data is contrary to the law and renders arbitrary 
and capricious any decision based on inadequate data. Such a conclusion is proper in 
light o f the policy and science behind monitoring requirements, and the precedent and 
reasoning o f federal case law.
II. Monitoring Requirements
A. The Science of Monitoring
Scientists agree that under our stewardship, or lack of it, species are going extinct 
at a rate far in excess of normal background evolutionary extinction rates -  up to 100,000 
times normal rates in the most species-rich tropical forests.^ While there are many 
anthropogenic causes of species loss, habitat destruction is often cited as the primary 
culprit, and timber harvest poses a serious threat to species survival through forest and 
stream habitat destruction and fragm entation.Effective forest management practices 
can minimize the effects of logging on forest species by maintaining diverse and healthy 
plant and animal populations. ‘ '
Maintaining diversity means more than preserving the number o f different species 
present in an area — a concept known as “species richness.”'  ̂ Maintaining diversity also
® Gary K. M effe & C. Ronald Carroll, PRINCIPLES OF C o n s e r v a t io n  B io l o g y  110 (1994); and  W ilson, 
supra  note 2 at 280.
M effe & Carroll, supra  note 9 at 237.
" Greg D. Corbin, The United States F orest S e n ic e  Response to B iodiversity Science, 29 E n v t l . L. 377, 
3 7 9 (1 9 9 9 )
Id. at 393-94.
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requires maintaining “species viability,” an abundance of individuals within a species, in 
order to guard against the loss of the individual species.'^ Effective forest management 
requires consideration of both measures, as changes in species richness may indicate loss 
o f especially sensitive species, and changes in species viability may signal that 
disturbances have affected individual species within an area.'" Further, genetic diversity 
within species is important to species’ ability to adapt to environmental changes and 
resist the deleterious genetic effects of shrinking populations.'* Finally, understanding 
the roles o f individual species within a larger community is necessary to preserving 
biodiversity by maintaining the ecosystem upon which all species in it rely.'*
One scientifically recognized method of monitoring and preserving biodiversity is 
population viability analysis (PVA). PVA incorporates many levels of biodiversity, 
including genetic and species diversity, habitat needs, spatial distribution, inter and intra­
population dynamics, and environmental influences on the continued existence of a 
population.'^ Once factors critical to a populations’ survival are determined, forest 
managers can estimate how many reproductive individuals are necessaiy to maintain 
diverse and healthy populations.'* While performing PVA for every species present in 
a forest is beyond the mandate, economic and logistic capabilities of the Forest Service, 
conducting PVA for a few “indicator species” is not. The indicator species concept, or 
“management indicator species” in Forest Service parlance, assumes that effects of
” Id. at 394.
'Ud.
M effe & Carroll supra  note 9 at 153-58. 
Corbin supra  note 11 at 396.
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management activities on a single species can be extrapolated to determine probable 
effects on the rest of the ecosystem/^ While not without its critics and some degree of 
uncertainty, this approach allows forest managers to focus on well-chosen species or 
groups of species to understand and predict the effects o f management de c i s i ons . I t  is 
axiomatic that monitoring the effects o f forest management practices on biodiversity is 
essential to determine their efficacy and to make meaningful changes in those practices.^' 
One basic tenet of PVA for any species is that whether attempting complex mathematical 
models of population dynamics or estimating the effects of habitat manipulation, 
accepted scientific methods require some estimate o f population size, if  not more detailed 
information.^^
Forest Service regulations and forest plans promulgated under those regulations 
require the Agency to maintain viable wildlife populations, and identify and collect data 
for management indicator species, as explained below. However, when the Forest 
Service finds itself with more to do than its staff or budget will allow, rather than spend 
precious resources collecting new information, the Agency often attempts to make 
management decisions based on data it already has.^^ This was the case when the Forest 
Service rejected the scientifically accepted methodology of PVA in favor of its own 
approach -  habitat viability analysis.^'^
This method allows the forest service to use data regarding habitat types already
Id. at 397.
-'‘ Id.
W ilkinson & Anderson, supra  note 1 at 304.
Corbin, supra  note 11 at 401.
‘^Andrew Orleman, D o the P roposed  F orest Service Regulations P rotect B iodiversity? An Analysis o f  the 
Continuing Viability o f  "Habitat Viability Analysis,"  2 0  J. L a n d  R e s o u r c e s  & E n v t l . L . 3 5 7 , 361  (2 0 0 0 ) .  
See  Sections III. E. and IV. D.
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gathered through timber resource inventories, and information regarding habitat 
requirements of individual species.^^ The Forest Service then extrapolates the number of 
individuals in a population from the numbers o f acres o f suitable habitat within the 
planning area.^^ The Agency would then look at the number of acres o f suitable habitat 
that would remain after a specific management prescription (e.g. timber sale) in order to 
determine whether or not the population would remain viable.^^
While this method may be less expensive and acceptable to the Agency and some 
courts, it ignores the fact that “[s]trictly as a matter o f science, however, the Forest 
Service’s ‘habitat viability analysis’ violates the most basic understanding that to 
determine population viability of individual species requires data on the population’s 
status.” *̂
B. Statutory Framework and Policy of Monitoring
1. National Environmental Policy Act
Due largely to growing public concern over the clearcutting of national forests, 
environmental groups in the late-1960s pursued change in Forest Service management 
practices; but convinced it was unlikely to come from the legislative or executive 
branches, they increasingly turned to the courts in their attempts to stop destructive 
management activities and to defend non-timber uses and values of forest lands.
These groups received an unexpected gift at the outset o f the Nixon
Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Service, 88 F.3d 754, 759 (9'*’ Cir. 1996). 
Id.
" M  at 758.
Corbin, supra  note 11 at 401 (citing M ichael L. Morrison et al., W ildlife-habitat Relationships 251 
(1992)).
Hirt, supra  note 1 at 253.
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administration, in the form o f the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)/° 
which significantly increased environmentalists’ ability to sue the Forest Service over 
management decisions/' NEPA is a procedural statute that provides for government 
analysis and public scrutiny of the environmental impacts o f agency decisionmaking, 
with the stated purpose o f ensuring the environmental effects o f agency actions are 
revealed and accommodated before those actions are undertaken/^
To further this purpose, NEPA imposes certain pre-decision information gathering 
obligations on all agencies o f the federal government/^ The most well known requires 
preparation o f an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before undertaking any major 
federal action that significantly effects the environment/'' NEPA also requires federal 
agencies “utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated 
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in 
decisionmaking which may have an impact on man’s environment.’’̂  ̂ In the mandate 
most related to monitoring requirements, NEPA says agencies shall “initiate and utilize 
ecological information in the planning and development o f resource-oriented projects.
NEPA also created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to “formulate 
and recommend national policies to promote the improvement o f the quality o f the 
environment.’’̂ ’ The CEQ regulations address federal agency methodology and scientific
“  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370d (1994).
16 U .S.C. §  1604(g)(1) (1994).
" 16 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1994).
42 U .S.C. §  4332(2)(C ) (1994 & Supp. Ill 1997). 
”  42 U .S.C. § 4332(2)(A ) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H ) (1994).
”  42 U.S.C. § 4 3 4 2 (1 9 9 4 ).
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accuracy in the context of EISs, stating “[ajgencies shall insure the professional integrity, 
including scientific integrity, o f the discussions and analyses in [EISs] . . , shall identify 
any methodologies used and shall make explicit reference . . .  to scientific and other 
sources relied upon for conclusions.” *̂
On their face, NEPA and the CEQ regulations require the Forest Service to gather 
and utilize scientifically supportable data prior to making forest management decisions. 
However, little is made of these mandates in federal court cases that defer to the Forest 
Service decisions based upon inadequate scientific methods or a total lack o f credible 
monitoring data.
2. National Forest Management Act 
A few years after the passage of NEPA, the Forest Service’s current system of 
forest planning was initiated in the Resources Planning Act o f 1974,^^ and was eventually 
amended by the National Forest Management Act o f 1976 (NFMA)."*® NFMA is the 
principal statute governing administration of the National Forests. It imposes numerous 
substantive management requirements, as well as a planning process incorporating the 
Resources Planning Act’s mandate that the Forest Service develop integrated LRMPs for 
each unit o f the National Forest System.'"
LRMPs, commonly known as forest plans, are analogous to city zoning 
regulations, because they identify appropriate uses for different areas within a national
3*40 C.F.R. § 1502.24.
”  K elly Murphy, Cutting Through the Forest o f  the Standing Doctrine: Challenging Resource 
M anagem ent Plans in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 18 U . A r k . LITTLE R oC K  L.J. 223, 228-234 (1996); 
Paul A. Garrahan, Failing to See the Forest fo r  the Trees: Standing to Challenge National Forest 
M anagem ent Plans, 16 V a. E n v t l . L.J. 145, 147-49(1996).
16 U .S.C. §§  1600-1614 (1994).
16 U.S.C. §  1604(a) (1994).
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forest, but do not necessarily instigate any activities. Once approved, the plan is binding 
on all management activities within a forest until revised.'*^ Revision is required at least 
every fifteen years, or more often as needed."*  ̂ NFMA also requires that the Forest 
Service comply with NEPA,'*^ and mandates an EIS accompany every forest plan.'*^
Among its substantive requirements, NFMA declares that the Forest Service must 
“provide for diversity o f plant and animal communities,""^ and must gather inventory and 
monitoring data."^ NFMA also established a process to continually evaluate forest plans 
for consistency with contemporary scientific understanding, and required input fi'om a 
Committee of Scientists in promulgating regulations to implement the diversity and 
monitoring requirements."®
To implement the diversity requirement, current Forest Service regulations state
that:
Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations 
of existing native and desired non-native species in the planning area. For 
planning purposes, a viable population shall be regarded as one which has 
estimated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure 
its continued existence is well distributed in the planning area. In order to 
insure that viable populations will be maintained, habitat must be provided 
to support, at least, a minimum number o f reproductive individuals and 
that habitat must be well distributed so that those individuals can interact 
with others in the planning area."^
«  16 U .S.C. §  1604(1) (1994).
16 U .S.C. § 1604(0(5) (1994).
42 U .S.C . §§  4321-4370 (1994).
16 U .S.C . §  1604(g)(1) (1994).
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1994).
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(2)(B) (1994).
16 U .S.C. §§ 1604 (0 (3 ), (5), and (h)(1).
36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000). See also  36 C.F.R. § 219.27(a)(6) (2000) (providing that “All management 
prescriptions sh a ll. . . [pjrovide for adequate fish and wildlife habitat to maintain viable populations o f  
existing native vertebrate species and provide that habitat for species chosen under § 219.19 is maintained 
and improved to the degree consistent with multiple-use objectives.”).
10
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This regulation identifies two measurements o f viability in the planning area: first, 
sufficient numbers o f reproducing individuals; and second, well distributed habitat/^ 
Recognizing that the Forest Service did not have the means to monitor these parameters 
for every species in the 191 million acre National Forest System, the regulations require 
that “[i]n order to estimate the effeets o f each [management] alternative on fish and 
wildlife populations,” the Forest Service “shall” designate M IS /' Further, the 219 
regulations state, “[pjlanning alternatives shall be stated and evaluated in terms of both 
amount and quality o f  habitat and o f  animal population trends of the management 
indicator species,”^̂  and that “[pjopulation trends of the management indicator species 
will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes determined.”^̂  Again, these 
regulations treat evaluation and monitoring of habitat and populations as separate and 
distinet requirements.
Embodying the Committee of Scientists’ recognition that “[n]o plan is better that 
the resource inventory data that support it,” '̂* the regulations also state “[ijventories shall 
include quantitative data making possible the evaluation o f diversity in terms of its prior 
and present condition.”^̂
Despite the Committee o f Scientists’ recognition of the need for actual population 
data and constant updating of scientific methodology, federal court deference to the 
Agency’s creative interpretations o f the regulations have allowed the Forest Service to
Corbin, supra  note 11 at 389.
36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) (2000).
" 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(2) (2000) emphasis supplied.
”  36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(6) (2000).
National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,554, 26,608 (M ay 4, 
1979).
” 36C .F .R . § 219 .2 6 (2 0 0 0 ).
1 1
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fudge or ignore its mandate to gather the kind of data that would enable the Agency to 
utilize modem techniques like PVA. Now, the upcoming adoption of the proposed 219 
regulations will codify the Agency’s less accurate and assumption-loaded concept of 
“habitat viability analysis.”^̂  This will allow the Forest Service free reign to legally 
employ a methodology, that may or may not fulfill NFMA’s mandate to preserve and 
promote biodiversity, in forest plans updated under the new regulations.^^ However, 
forest plans promulgated under the current regulations will still be governed by them for 
years to come,^® and federal court enforcement o f their monitoring requirements could 
protect biodiversity on hundreds of thousands of acres, and provide a yardstick with 
which to compare the effects o f the new regulations.
3. Administrative Procedure Act 
Neither NFMA nor NEPA contain a citizen suit provision, which allows 
concerned citizens and groups representing their interests to seek judicial enforcement of 
these acts’ requirements. Therefore, judicial review o f agency decisions under these acts 
is accomplished through provisions o f the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).^’
Section 10(a) of the APA provides that “a person suffering a legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of 
the relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.’’̂®
The APA incorporates the judicial doctrine of “ripeness” by allowing judicial
See generally  Orleman, supra  note 23.
"  36 C.F.R. § 2 1 9 .29 (2000).
5 U .S.C . § §  551-559, 701-706 (1994).
bO 5 U .S.C. §  702 (1994 & Supp. Ill 1997).
12
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review of agency action only when it is a “final agency action.”** The Supreme Court 
recently stated two conditions that must be met for an administrative action to be 
considered final under the APA: (1) the action should mark the consummation of the 
agency’s decisionmaking process, and (2) the action should be one by which rights or 
obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences flow,*^ Agency 
failures to act are also reviewable,*^ and courts may compel “agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.”***
The APA also addresses the appropriate standard under which courts review 
agencies’ actions and interpretations o f their regulations. Section 706(2)(A) of the APA 
directs the reviewing court to set aside agency action if  it is “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”**
The following section examines cases challenging agency failures to adequately 
follow the monitoring and surveying requirements o f NFMA and individual LRMPs, 
where some federal courts have invoked the judicial doctrine of ripeness, as interpreted 
by the recent Supreme Court decision in Ohio Forestry Ass ’n v. Sierra C/w6,** and held 
that inadequate monitoring is not a final agency action or failure to act.*’ Some of these 
decisions also suggest that agencies are entitled to substantial deference in interpreting 
the monitoring and surveying requirements, and that this deference allows the agencies to
5 U.S.C. § 7 0 4 (1 9 9 4 ) .
“  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997).
See 5 U .S.C . § 551(13) (1994) (expanding the definition o f  “agency action” to include a “failure to act”). 
See also  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A ) (1994) (allowing courts to find an agency’s failure to act “arbitrary and 
capricious).
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994 & Supp. Ill 1997).
5 U .S.C. § 706(2)(A ).
^  523 U.S. 726(1 9 9 8 ).
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 2000 WL 1357506 (5*̂  Cir. 2000); Ecology’ Center v. United States Forest 
Service, 192 F.3d 922 (9* Cir. 1999).
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inadequately comply with or ignore these requirements altogether.®*
Other federal court decisions have held that challenges to agency noncompliance 
with species monitoring requirements are ripe for review as final agency actions or 
failures to act, and that while the agency is entitled to deference in interpreting these 
regulations, the agency’s failure to collect the required data rendered arbitrary and 
capricious any decisions based on the absent or inadequate data.®̂
III. Ohio Forestry -  Ripeness and Final Agency Action
A. Introduction
In Ohio Forestry, t w o  environmental groups challenged the U.S. Forest Service's 
Land and Resource Management Plan (LRMP) for the Wayne National Forest in Ohio, 
claiming that it allowed too much logging and clearcutting.^' An association of forest 
industry interests, intervening on behalf o f the Forest Service, claimed that the plan itself 
did not initiate specific timber sales, and thus was not ripe for review.’  ̂ On May 18,
1998, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision, written by Justice Breyer, held the 
challenge was not ripe and thereby limited the availability of judicial review of Forest 
Service LRMPs under the ripeness doctrine.
Despite the limitations placed on challenges to forest plans by the Ohio Forestry 
holding, dicta specifically identified two types o f challenges the Court would consider
Id.
S ierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1(11'*' Cir, 1999); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349 (5'*’ Cir. 1999) 
reversed after rehearing en banc; Oregon Natural Resources Council Action  v. United States Forest 
Service, 192 F.Supp.2d 1085 (W .D. Wash. 1999); Pacific Coast F e d ’n o f  Fishermen 'n v. National 
M arine Fisheries Service, 71 F.Supp.2d 1063 (W .D. Wash. 1999).
™ 1 1 8 S . Ct. 1665(1998).
’* Id. at 1669.
”  Id. at 1670.
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ripe for judicial review: procedural claims, and substantive claims alleging site-specific 
and imminent harm. However, recent federal district and appellate court decisions 
demonstrate that questions remain as to the Ohio Forestry ruling’s effect on monitoring 
challenges involving LRMPs.
This section provides background on the ripeness doctrine, and previous cases 
challenging forest plans, then examines the Wayne National Forest case in detail. An 
analysis of the decision’s implications follows, illustrated by recent cases that interpret 
Ohio Forestry. This section concludes that recent decisions by lower courts are 
inconsistent in their characterization of claims as either procedural or substantive. Courts 
also misconstrue Ohio Forestry to require site-specific allegations in procedural claims, 
as well as claims alleging substantive defects in a plan. In light o f Ohio Forestry, courts 
should consider ripe claims of procedural defects in agencies’ compliance with 
monitoring requirements in regulations and LRMPs, without requiring allegations of 
imminent site-specific injuries. This section concludes that in such cases, reliance on 
Ohio Forestry is misplaced and serves only to confuse the issue.
B. Background
1. The Ripeness Doctrine 
Ripeness and the related doctrine of standing are concepts of justiciability that 
limit access to courts by requiring a determination of “whether the litigant is entitled to 
have the court decide the merits o f the dispute or of particular issues.’’̂ " The source of
Paul A. Garrahan, Failing to See the F orest fo r  the Trees: Standing to Challenge National Forest 
M anagem ent Plans, 16 V a. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 158-59 (1996) (quoting Warth v . Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498  
(1974)).
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both doctrines is disputed, but standing is now generally accepted as a non-discretionary 
requirement o f the “case or controversy” element in Article III o f the Constitution/^ 
Though ripeness is frequently associated with Article III, it is often characterized by the 
Supreme Court as a prudential and discretionary limit/^ Since the Court addresses the 
ripeness issue but declines discussion of standing in line with its practice o f not deciding 
cases on constitutional grounds when discretionary limitations are available, Ohio 
Forestry supports the proposition that ripeness is a prudential and discretionary 
limitation/^
Despite their sources, the doctrines of standing and ripeness are so closely related 
that “[f]ew courts draw meaningful distinctions between the two.” *̂ One reason for this 
confusion is that tests for the justiciability o f a controversy under both doctrines initially 
address the imminence o f injury to the plaintiff in similar terms/® The important 
distinction between the two is that standing determines the proper party to bring suit, 
where ripeness determines the proper time to bring suit/® Some courts recognize the 
ripeness doctrine is more appropriate to determine the justiciability o f injuries that have 
not yet occurred/'
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner is the leading case on the ripeness doctrine as
at 159.
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. RJEV. 153, 155 (1987).
”  Steven P. Quarles & ITiomas R. Lundquist, The Supreme Court Restricts Availability o f  Judicial Review  
in Ohio F orestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 28 E n v t l . L. R e p . 10621, 10626 (1998) (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 
U.S. 732). Quarles represented the petitioner, Ohio Forestry Association, in Ohio Forestry.
Wilderness Soc'y v. A lcock, 83 F.3d 386, 389 (11^ Cir. 1996).
Id. at 390. For Example, one prong o f  the standing test requires the injury be “actual or imminent,” and 
the traditional ripeness test requires it be immediate or imminently threatened.
““ M  
" Id.
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applied to challenges to administrative a c t i o n s .T h e  Court stated “its basic rationale is 
to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling 
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the 
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized 
and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. The Court also stated a 
two-prong test for deciding whether an agency’s decision is ripe for judicial review, 
requiring evaluation of both “the fitness o f the issue for judicial decision, and the 
hardship to the parties o f withholding court consideration.”*'*
2. Judicial Climate Prior to Ohio Forestry 
In 1990 the Supreme Court in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation*^ construed 
the allowable scope of judicial review under the APA of public land management plans.** 
Lujan involved an environmental group’s challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's 
(BLM) land withdrawal review program.*’ The complaint was based on alleged 
violations to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976** (FLPMA) and 
NEPA. Like NFMA, FLPMA provides no private right o f action for violations o f its 
provisions, so plaintiffs in Lujan sought judicial review under section 10(a) of the APA.*^ 
The Court addressed the ripeness of this challenge, and held the program was not “agency 
action” or “final agency action,” within the meaning of the APA.^”
*-387 U.S. 136(1967).
** Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 149.
497 U.S. 871 (1990).
** Beth Brennan & Matt Clifford, Standing, Ripeness, and Forest Plan Appeals, 17 PUB. L a n d  &  
R e s o u r c e s  L. R e v . 125 ,133-35  (1996).
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 875.
** 43 U.S.C. §§  1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 882.
Id. at 890.
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The Court reasoned that the program “does not refer to a single BLM order or 
regulation, or even to a completed universe of BLM orders and regulations,” but refers to 
“the continuing (and thus constantly changing) operations of BLM.” '̂ The decision 
stated “a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action ripe for review 
under the APA until the scope o f the controversy has been reduced to more manageable 
proportions and its factual components fleshed out by some concrete action applying the 
regulation to the claimant’s situation in a fashion that harms or threatens him.”^̂
A major exception noted in Lujan “is a substantive rule which as a practical 
matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately,” and stated that this type 
of agency action is ripe for review.”  The “case-by-case approach that this requires is 
understandably frustrating to [environmental organizations seeking] across-the-board 
protection of [natural resources],” but, the Court stated, such a limitation is the 
“traditional” and “normal mode of operation o f the courts.” '̂* The Court said that unless 
Congress specifically provides for judicial review “at a higher level of generality, we 
intervene . . . only when . . .  a specific ‘final agency action’ has an actual or immediately 
threatened effect.”’^
By the mid-1990s the federal appeals courts’ varying interpretations o f Lujan
at 891.
”  Id  (citing A bbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 152-54).
Id. at 894.
Id. (citing Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 164-66 (1967)).
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resulted in an even circuit split regarding the reviewability o f LRMPs.’  ̂ The Seventh^’ 
and Ninth Circuits^* upheld such challenges, holding that the controversies were ripe for 
review because the plans were final, appealable, and presented threats of actual and 
imminent harm. The Eighth^’ and Eleventh Circuits'®'’ denied the justiciability of such 
claims on standing and ripeness grounds, finding the plans were merely advisory 
documents intended to guide site-specific decisions, and that allegations of injury were 
speculative prior to site-specific implementation of the plans. This was the unsettled state 
o f the law regarding the ripeness of LRMP challenges when the Wayne National Forest 
controversy reached the Sixth Circuit,'®' and is likely the reason the Supreme Court 
accepted this case for review.
C, Ohio Forestry
The planning process for the Wayne National Forest began in 1981.'®  ̂ Two 
environmental groups, the Sierra Club and the Citizens Council on Conservation and
Garrahan, supra  note 72, at 172-74; Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 75, at 10622; Brennan & Clifford, 
supra  note 84 at 141-48; and M iles A. Yanick, Loss o f  Protection as Injury in Fact: An Approach to 
Establishing Standing to Challenge Environmental Planning Decisions, 29  U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 857, 865- 
873 (1996).
Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7* Cir. 1995). The court held a forest plan and its EIS were ripe for 
review because they could cause imminent harm, regardless o f  their programmatic nature. Id. at 613-14. 
Further, the court distinguished Lujan on the basis that here the Forest Service had issued a final, 
appealable plan. W. at 614.
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9“' Cir. 1992). This court similarly distinguished 
Lujan on both standing and ripeness grounds. See Id. at 1513-19. See also  Resources Ltd., Inc. v. 
Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9* Cir. 1993) (reversing the lower courts holding that the challenged LRMP was 
not ripe for review because there was no “actual or immediately threatened effect”); and Seattle Audubon 
Soc'y V. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9"' Cir. 1993) (finding that while logging might not occur under the plan, 
potential harm to plaintiffs aesthetic and scientific interests in owls that inhabit the forest constituted 
imminent injury).
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8* Cir. 1994). Here the court found the LRMP was a 
programmatic document that did not “effectuate any on-the-ground environmental consequences,” and 
noted that events would occur between the plan and site-specific projects, making any injury from the plan 
merely speculative. Id. at 758.
Wilderness Soc'y. 83 F.3d 386 (holding that the LRMP was not ripe for review prior to a second stage 
site-specific decision).
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6 ‘̂  Cir. 1997), rev'd and vacated by Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. 726 
(1998).
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 489 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd bv Sierra Club v. Thomas. 105 
F.3d 248 (6'  ̂Cir. 1997).
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Environmental Control participated in the planning process and the public comment 
period following publication of the proposed Plan and the draft EIS.'°^ In 1988, the 
Forest Service adopted the final plan and accompanying final EIS.'^ Both groups 
complained of the Plan’s designation of suitable timber lands and harvest methods, and 
appealed the adoption of the Plan through administrative channels.'”̂  The Chief of the 
Forest Service denied the groups’ appeals in 1992 and affirmed adoption of the Plan, so 
they instigated legal action two months later.
The complaint included three counts. First, the groups alleged that approval of 
a plan that permits below-cost timber sales accomplished by clearcutting violates NFMA, 
NEPA, and the APA.’°* Second, they claimed that by permitting below-cost timber sales, 
the Forest Service violated its duty as public t r u s t ee s .Th i rd ,  the plaintiffs alleged that 
by selecting lands suitable for timber production, the Forest Service followed regulations 
that failed to properly identify “economically unsuitable lands’’ and such lands were 
placed into a category where logging could take place."*’ Thus the regulations violated 
NFMA and the APA as an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion, not in accordance 
with law. ‘ ' '
The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the plan and the below-cost 
timber sales and clearcutting it authorized are unlawful, and sought an injunction 
prohibiting the Forest Service from allowing further timber harvest or below-cost timber
Id.
Id.
w 'A i
Id.
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 731. 
Id.
110Id.
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sales pending revision of the Plan."^
1. Procedural History
At the district court level, the parties did not raise the issue of justiciability, and in 
Sierra Club v. Robertson, Judge James L. Graham granted summary judgment for the 
Forest Service on the merits.”  ̂ Judge Graham held the plaintiffs “failed to show that in 
adopting the plan for the Wayne [National Forest], the Forest Service acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously or that the plan is contrary to the law.”” '*
The plaintiffs appealed, and in Sierra Club v. Thomas the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit reversed and joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, in holding that Forest 
Service LRMPs are ripe for judicial review.”  ̂ The decision first addressed the threshold 
issue of justiciability with a discussion of standing.*'^ The court stated that “[i]n cases 
involving Land Resource Management Plans, the most controverted standing issue is 
whether injury is imminent.”" ’ The Sixth Circuit determined LRMPs “represent 
significant and concrete decisions that play a critical role in future Forest Service 
actions,” and stated that if the plaintiffs were only allowed to challenge the plan at the 
site-specific stage, “then the meaningful citizen participation contemplated by the 
[NFMA] would forever escape review.”'** Then, specifically addressing the ripeness of 
the controversy, the decision concluded “[p]laintiffs need not wait to challenge a specific 
project when their grievance is with an overall plan.”"^
Turning to the merits o f the plaintiffs first and third claims, the court found that
Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 489.
at 503.
Thomas, 105 F.3d at 250.
""M  at 250.
117 Id.
Id. (quoting Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516).
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the Forest Service’s planning process was “improperly predisposed toward clearcutting” 
and the resulting plan was “arbitrary and capricious because it is based upon this artificial 
narrowing of options.” ’̂ ® The decision then engaged in an extraordinary analysis of the 
planning process, accusing the Forest Service of maintaining political and economic 
biases in favor of timber production and undervaluing primitive recreational uses.'^‘ In a 
concurring opinion. Judge Batchelder said “speculation about the motives and biases of 
the Forest Service, even if accurate, is unnecessary, and therefore, ought not to be voiced 
in this opinion.” '̂  ̂ In conclusion, the court found the Forest Service “failed to comply 
with the protective spirit o f the [NFMA],” and that this noncompliance violated section 
1604(g)(3)(F)(v) of the Act.'^^
2. Supreme Court Decision 
The Ohio Forestry Association was an intervenor-defendant in both lower court 
cases, but maintained a low profile until the appellate court’s decision raised the stakes 
for the logging i n d u s t r y . T h e  Ohio Forestry Assoeiation petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari over the objections of the plaintiffs and surprisingly, the Forest Service, whieh 
argued against Supreme Court review on procedural g r o u n d s . T h e  Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in October, 1997, to determine whether the dispute presented a 
justiciable controversy, and if  so, whether the LRMP conformed to statutory and 
regulatory requirements.'^*^
W. at 251.
Id. at 251-52,
Id. (Batchelder, J., concurring).
Id. at 252. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v) (requiring even-aged management practices (i.e. 
clearcutting) be used in national forests only when consistent with the protection o f  soil, watershed, fish, 
w ildlife, recreation, and aesthetic resources, and the regeneration o f  the timber resource).
Quarles & Lundquist, supra  note 75, at 10624.
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 732.
22
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In briefs and at oral argument, the Forest Service realigned itself with the Ohio 
Forestry Association and argued that the suit was not justiciable because the plaintiffs 
lacked standing and because the dispute over the plan’s specifications for logging and 
clearcutting was not yet ripe for judicial r e v i e w . B e c a u s e  the Court disagreed with the 
Sixth Circuit and held the dispute was not ripe for review, the decision did not discuss 
standing or the merits of the case.
3. Reasoning and Analysis 
In reaching its decision in Ohio Forestry, the Court relied primarily on two 
important ripeness decisions, Abbott Laboratories^^^ and Lujan}^'^ The Court modified 
the two-prong ripeness test from Abbott Laboratories, and distilled it into three factors. 
The first factor asks whether delayed review would cause the plaintiff hardship. ' The 
second factor requires determination of whether judicial intervention would 
inappropriately interfere with further administrative action by the d e f e n d a n t . T h e  third 
factor asks whether the courts would benefit from further factual development of the 
issues presented.
In applying this standard, the Court first found that the plaintiffs failed to show 
delayed review would cause them hardship. The Court stated the challenged LRMP does 
not “create any adverse effects o f a strictly legal kind, that is, effects of a sort that 
traditionally would have qualified as harm,” since LRMPs “do not command anyone to 
do anything or to refrain from doing anything.” '̂ '* To illustrate, the Court said “the Plan
Id.
A bbott Lab., m V . S , .  136, 
Lujan, A91 U .S. 871.
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733.
Id.
' » I d
Id. (paraphrasing U .S. v. Los A ngeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927)).
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does not give anyone a legal right to cut trees, nor does it abolish anyone's legal authority 
to object to trees being cut.” '̂  ̂ The Court also found that the plan could not inflict 
immediate harm because several steps were required before the Forest Service could 
initiate any site-specific activity based on the plan, and plaintiffs could bring a challenge 
then.'^^ Plaintiffs contended that the expense of multiple site-specific challenges required 
by delayed review, would constitute h a r d s h i p . T h e  Court responded that “this kind of 
litigation cost-saving” is insufficient to justify review of an otherwise unripe case, 
because the disadvantages o f premature review outweigh the additional costs.
Second, the Court found immediate review would interfere with further agency 
action by hindering the Forest Service’s efforts to refine its policies, correct its own 
mistakes, and apply its own expertise.'^’ The Court added that “further consideration will 
occur before the Plan is implemented,” and hearing the challenge now would “interfere 
with the system that Congress specified for the agency to reach forest logging 
decisions.” ’̂ '®
Third, the Court found immediate review “would require time-consuming judicial 
consideration of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan” with effects that may 
change over time.’'̂ ’ The decision stated that this is the type of “abstract disagreement 
over administrative policies’ that the ripeness doctrine seeks to avoid,” and it would be 
best to wait until the controversy was “reduced to more manageable proportions,” and its 
“factual components [were] fleshed out” to “significantly advance our ability to deal with
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735. The Court then quoted Lujan for further justification o f  the case-by-case approach. Id. 
Id. (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)).
Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 735.
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the legal issues presented."'"^
The Court also addressed the legislative intent behind NFMA, differentiating it 
from NEPA and other environmental statutes where Congress has specifically allowed for 
judicial review prior to enforcement.'"^ In the judgment o f the Court, Congress had not 
provided for pre-implementation judicial review of forest plans.'"" The Ohio Forestry 
opinion distinguishes substantive challenges to LRMPs under NFMA from procedural 
challenges under NEPA, stating that NEPA “guarantees a particular procedure, not a 
specific result.” '"̂  The purpose of NEPA is to insure that environmental effects of 
government agency actions are discovered and considered before action is t a k e n . I n  
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, the Ninth Circuit illustrated this point, 
recognizing that when an agency does not follow procedures required by NEPA, the “risk 
that environmental impact will be overlooked” is the injury inflicted.'"^ In Ohio Forestry, 
the Court stated that a procedural challenge brought by a plaintiff who is injured by a 
failure to comply with NEPA “may complain o f that failure at the time the failure takes 
place, for the claim can never get riper.”'"®
In a final attempt to avoid dismissal for lack of ripeness, the plaintiffs argued that 
the opening of trails to motorized travel and coinciding failure to promote backcountry
Id. at 736-37(m tem al quotations omitted) (quoting A bbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 148, Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891, 
and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978)).
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 4 3 2 1  (1994).
956 F.2d at 1514.
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737. In Lujan v. Defenders o f  W ildlife, the Court illustrates this point in 
terms o f  standing, stating “[tjhus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed 
construction o f  a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s failure to prepare 
an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement 
w ill cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam w ill not be completed for many 
years.” 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.7 (1992).
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recreation in areas designated for logging are harms that will occur now. However, the 
complaint did not include these claims, so the Court declined to address them.‘̂ ° But the 
Court did state that the Government's brief and the Solicitor General, at oral argument, 
conceded that concerns of immediate harm resulting from the plan would be justiciable.'^' 
The Court explicitly recognized that if the plaintiffs “had previously raised these kinds of 
harm, the ripeness analysis in this case with respect to those provisions of the Plan that 
produce the harm would be significantly different.” '̂  ̂ Also, the Court’s statement that 
the plaintiffs could not point to “any other way in which the Plan could now force it to 
modify its behavior in order to avoid future adverse consequences,”'®̂ implicitly 
recognizes that when a plaintiff can show a forest plan forces such a modification, the 
plan, or a part of it, is ripe for review. Lujan supports this view, finding elements o f a 
plan that require claimants to immediately adjust their behavior are ripe. The Court, in 
Ohio Forestry, added “[a]ny such later challenge might also include a challenge to the 
lawfulness of the present Plan if (but only if) the present Plan then matters, i.e., if the 
Plan plays a causal role with respect to the future, then imminent, harm from logging.”'®" 
Despite the Court’s closing out review of substantive provisions of LRMP’s on 
the facts presented, Ohio Forestry expressed dicta that leaves open two avenues to 
challenge LRMPs: 1) claims of procedural harm, and 2) claims of substantive defects in a 
plan where injuries are not contingent on some activity requiring a second stage of 
decision making after the plan’s adoption. The Court’s reasoning and the foregoing 
analysis suggest site-specific allegations of imminent harm are necessary to claimants
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 738.
Id. at 739.
'" M  at 738 
M  at 734
154 Id.
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taking the second avenue, but not the first. Subsequent LRMP cases interpreting Ohio 
Forestry demonstrate apparent confusion over the characterization of claims as 
procedural or substantive, and when to require site-specific allegations of imminent harm.
D. Judicial Interpretation of Ohio Forestry
In recent cases involving LRMP challenges, several federal courts found claims of 
procedural harm, and substantive claims of imminent site-specific harm justiciable in 
light of Ohio Forestry. Others have declined to do so, relying in part on Ohio Forestry to 
deny the ripeness of challenges to the Forest Service’s failure to follow the monitoring 
requirements of its own regulations and LRMPs. Such challenges should be 
characterized as procedural claims and allowed without requiring site-specific allegations.
1. Federal District Court Decisions
In Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. Worthington, environmental groups sought to 
prevent certain logging activities in eastern Kentucky’s Daniel Boone Forest until the 
Forest Service complied with applicable law, administrative regulations, and the 
provisions of the Forest Plan.'^^ The plaintiffs asserted four separate claims. First, they 
alleged the agency violated the ESA’s requirement of consultation with the Fish and 
Wildlife Service'^* in adopting the Plan, nine amendments to the Plan and three 
management policies which authorized projects that may affect listed species.'^’ Second, 
the plaintiffs claimed the Forest Service’s failure to consider alternatives to clearcutting 
violated NEPA requirement that the agency study, develop, and describe appropriate 
alternatives in the EIS that accompanies the Forest Plan.’̂ * Third, the plaintiffs argued
20 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1090 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (supp. 1999), 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.11 and 402.14 (1999).
Kentucky Heartwooci, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. The Daniel Boone Forest is home to at least thirty-three 
threatened or endangered species o f  plants and animals. Id. at 1081-82.
Id.
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the agency violated NFMA’s requirement that amendments and policies supplemental to 
the Forest Plan go through the NEPA process before they can legally guide management 
activities in the fores t .Final ly ,  they challenged the Forest Plan’s adoption of 
clearcutting as the exclusive timber harvest method, claiming it violated NFMA, which 
does not allow exclusive use o f clearcutting.'^
After a lengthy discussion of the facts and holding in Ohio Forestry, District 
Court Judge Forester characterized the plaintiffs’ first three claims as procedural and held 
their ESA and NEPA challenges to the forest plan were ripe, and their NFMA claim was 
also ripe “as it relates to defendant’s failure to comply with a particular procedure.”*®' 
However, Judge Forester dismissed the NFMA challenge to the forest plan’s 
authorization of clearcutting as the exclusive harvest method, stating that challenges to 
the content o f forest plans brought pursuant to NFMA are not justiciable in light o f Ohio 
Forestry
Kentucky Heartwood applies the Ohio Forestry decision’s acceptance of 
procedural challenges to LRMPs. It also demonstrates that not all claims brought under 
NFMA need necessarily be characterized as substantive. Though the Court in Ohio 
Forestry makes a rough distinction between NEPA claims as procedural and NFMA 
claims as substantive, this court finds that NFMA and ESA claims may also be 
procedural in nature.
'“ M  at 1088.
Jd. at 1090.
Id. (noting that Ohio Forestry  distinguishes NEPA from NFM A on the grounds that former requires a 
particular procedure, while the latter requires a particular result. 523 U .S. at 737).
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2. Federal Circuit Court Decisions
a. D C. Circuit
In Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Service, a collection of 
environmental groups challenged a Forest Service decision authorizing oil and gas 
leasing o f land in the Shoshone National Forest in northwestern W y o m i n g . T h e  
plaintiffs argued the Agency violated its own regulations governing the leases and 
violated NEPA by authorizing the leases without first determining whether an adequate 
site specific environmental review had been performed.’̂ '*
The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 governs the 
issuance o f oil and gas leases in national f o r e s t s . I n  1990, the Forest Service 
promulgated regulations implementing its responsibilities under the Act.'^* The 
regulations require Forest Service authorization of leases shall be subject to three site- 
specific factual findings made by the A g e n c y . F i r s t ,  the Forest Service must verify that 
leasing of the specific lands has been adequately addressed in a NEPA document and is 
consistent with the forest’s LRMP.'** If the Agency determines that NEPA has not been 
satisfied or further environmental assessment is necessary, additional analysis must be 
done before a leasing decision is made for specific l a n d s . S e c o n d ,  the Agency must 
ensure that conditions o f surface use are stipulated in any resulting lease.'™ Third, the 
Forest Service must determine that the proposed surface use is allowable somewhere on
165 F .3d 43  (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
at 45.
'“ /</. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 226(g)-(h) (Supp. 1999)).
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(c) and (e) (1999)).
Id.
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e)(1) (1999)).
Id.
Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(c)(1) and (e)(2) (1999)).
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the land subject to leasing.'^'
In the EIS and the ROD for the proposed leases, the Forest Service found NEPA 
compliance was adequate, but expressly stated that it was not making any of the required 
f i n d i n g s . T h e  plaintiffs challenged the Agency’s failure to include the required 
findings in the EIS and ROD, claiming this violated the Agency’s regulations and 
NEPA.^’̂  The District Court held for the defendants, deferring to the Agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations and finding that the Service’s EIS was sufficiently 
site-specific that it did not violate NEPA.'^‘‘ This appeal followed. In the meantime, the 
Agency completed the NEPA process, made the required findings, and authorized the 
BLM to lease three parcels in the Shoshone National Forest.
After a discussion of the Constitution’s Article III jurisdictional requirements, the 
Court o f Appeals for the District of Columbia focused on the prudential concern of 
ripeness, and applied the Ohio Forestry three-part test.'’  ̂ With the benefit of hindsight, 
the court held the “point o f irreversible and irretrievable commitment o f resources and the 
concomitant obligation to fully comply with NEPA [did] not mature until the leases 
[were] issued,” and thus the claim was unripe at the time the plaintiffs filed their 
a p p e a l . T h e  court went on to say the plaintiffs could challenge the Service’s NEPA 
compliance after the BLM issued the leases.
In contrast, the court characterized as procedural the plaintiffs’ claim that the 
Agency violated its own regulations by issuing the EIS and ROD without completing the
M  (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e)(3) (1999)). 
Id. at 47.
173 Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48-49. 
Id. at 49. 
""M  at 50.
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required f i n d i n g s . T h e  court stated that where an agency promulgates regulations that 
erect a procedural barrier and then ignores them, the plaintiff need only show that the 
government act performed without the procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a 
particularized interest o f the plaintiff.'*” Then, quoting Ohio Forestry, the court went on 
to say a person injured by an agency’s failure to comply with a procedural requirement 
may complain of the failure when it occurs, because the claim can never get riper.'*'
Wyoming Outdoor Council treats ripeness as prudential requirement and shows 
that all NEPA-based challenges to LRMPs are not necessarily ripe in light o f Ohio 
Forestry. However, this decision does recognize the procedural nature and ripeness o f an 
agency decision to ignore its own implementing regulations. By finding an agency 
decision to ignore the procedural requirements o f its own regulations ripe for review, the
D.C. Circuit implies that such a decision is a final agency action or failure to act under 
the APA.
b. Ninth Circuit
Wilderness Society v. Thomas required the Ninth Circuit to decide whether the 
Forest Service violated NFMA in preparing a LRMP for the Prescott National Forest in 
central Arizona.'*^ The final Prescott National Forest Plan identified a total amount of 
land not physically “capable” of sustaining commercial grazing.'** A coalition of 
environmental groups filed suit, claiming in count one that the Plan violates NFMA and 
Forest Service regulations which also require a separate analysis to determine if  lands 
physically “capable” of sustaining grazing are also “suitable” for grazing, taking into
at 51.
Id. (quoting Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
Id. (quoting Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737).
188 F.3d 1 1 3 0 (9 “’ Cir. 1999).
M  at 1132.
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account economic and environmental considerations, as well as alternative uses for the 
land.'®" The plaintiffs also made site-specific challenges, alleging in counts two and three 
that the Agency violated NFMA when it issued grazing permits for two grazing 
allotments pursuant to the Plan. The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants and this appeal followed.'*®
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by applying the Ohio Forestry three-part 
test to determine the ripeness of the plaintiffs’ claims.'** The court then acknowledged 
that Ohio Forestry allows challenges to a forest plan when plaintiffs allege either 
imminent, concrete injuries that would be caused by the plan, or a site-specific injury 
causally related to an alleged defect in the plan.'*^ The court characterized count one as 
“a generic challenge [to a forest plan] that Ohio Forestry cautions against adjudicating” 
and held it unripe for review despite the court’s explicit acknowledgment of the defective 
forest plan’s causal relationship to the site-specific injuries alleged in counts two and 
three.'** The court then found counts two and three ripe for review and stated that 
“[bjecause the site-specific injury to the two [grazing] allotments is alleged to have been 
caused by a defect in the Forest Plan, we may consider whether the Forest Service 
complied with NFMA in making its general its general grazing suitability determinations 
in the Forest Plan.”'*̂
In Wilderness Society, the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized the justiciability of 
Forest Service noncompliance with a forest plan, when the failure to comply causes site- 
specific harm. Wilderness Society suggests that noncompliance with the mandates of a
'" M  at 1132-33.
M  at 1133.
Id. (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733).
Id. at 1133-34 (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 738-39). 
Id. 1134.
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forest plan is a final agency action or a justiciable failure to act for purposes of the APA. 
Wilderness Society also unnecessarily extends the Ohio Forestry requirement o f site- 
specific harm to what is more properly characterized as a procedural claim.
Friends O f The Kalmiopsis v. United States Forest Service is a memorandum 
decision issued by the Ninth Circuit involving a challenge by environmental groups to the 
Forest Service’s handling of off-road vehicle (ORV) impacts in the Siskiyou National 
Forest in southwest Oregon and northwest California.'^ The plaintiffs claimed first that 
the Forest Service violated NFMA by failing to amend or revise the Forest LRMP to 
address new information pertaining to the spread of disease fatal to Port Orford cedar 
trees. Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the Service violated an executive order and the 
Agency’s own implementing regulations by its failure to adequately monitor ORV 
impacts and prepare annual reviews of the Forest’s ORV management plan. Finally, the 
environmental groups claimed that the Agency’s violation of its own wet-season road 
closure was arbitrary and capricious.'^'
The court found the Agency’s “lax monitoring unlikely to expose potential 
problems caused by ORVs” '̂  ̂ However, the court found the claim unripe for review 
under the APA because there was no complete failure to perform a legally required duty 
that is necessary to constitute a final agency action or failure to act.'^^ The agency and 
the court concede that in light of Ohio Forestry, these claims would be ripe for review if 
the harm was made more imminent by a Forest Service attempt to revise its Forest Plan 
or designate ORV areas without adequate monitoring.'^" In this case however, the court
198 F.3d 253 (9“' Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. 726).
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found no imminent agency action that hinged on the result o f the allegedly deficient 
monitoring results and annual plan review
In Friends O f The Kalmiopsis^ the Ninth Circuit addressed ripeness o f claims 
brought under the APA which allege Forest Service failure to adequately fulfill 
monitoring requirements. Here, the court relied on Ohio Forestry and expressly stated 
that such claims would be ripe if  the Forest Service made the harm more imminent by 
taking site-specific action based on inadequate monitoring. This suggests that the court is 
actually focusing on Ohio Forestry's imminence requirement and not the finality of an 
agency decision to disregard mandatory regulations. However, Ohio Forestry involved a 
challenge to substantive provisions o f an LRMP, which is easily distinguished from cases 
challenging agency interpretation and implementation o f LRMP provisions. While a 
generic (non-site-specific) challenge to the content o f an LRMP may indeed benefit from 
the focus provided by imminent site-specific harm, challenges to agency interpretation 
and implementation of forest plans and regulations are more akin to the procedural claims 
that Ohio Forestry recognizes as ripe when they occur.
E. Ripeness in Species Monitoring Cases
1. ONRC V. United States Forest Service 
Plaintiffs in Oregon Natural Resources Council Action v. United States Forest 
Service and Bureau o f  Land Management (ONRC) claimed the federal agencies violated 
the monitoring and surveying requirements o f their own LRMP.'^^ The LRMP in this 
case was the Northwest Forest Plan, adopted in 1994 in response to concerns over the 
management of federal forests within the geographic range of the northern spotted owl.''^’
I d
59 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W .D. Wash. 1999) (hereinafter ONRC). 
at 1087.
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The plan seeks to ensure the viability of certain rare species by requiring surveys for 
those species before any ground-disturbing activities that are implemented after a specific 
cut-off date.'^* The agencies issued memoranda exempting timber sales from survey 
requirements when the sales’ EISs were completed before the applicable cut-off date, or 
when the sales were to take place in an area of abundant red tree vole habitat or isolated 
watersheds under private ownership.
The plaintiffs claimed the agencies’ authorization of certain timber sales without 
first conducting surveys for certain species of wildlife, as required by the LRMP,^^ 
violated NFMA and FLPMA and their implementing regulations which require timber 
sales be consistent with guiding LRMPs.^'” The plaintiffs also alleged a NEPA violation 
because significant new information had come to light which the agencies failed to 
address by preparing a supplemental EIS^“  as required by NEPA and its implementing 
regulations.^^
District Court Judge Dwyer characterized the plaintiffs’ claims as procedural 
because they sought to enforce a procedural requirement that, if  disregarded, could impair 
their concrete interests.^*’'* The agencies and intervening timber companies argued these 
claims were not final agency actions and not ripe for review under Ohio Forestry 
Judge Dwyer found the NEPA claims ripe for review under section 706(1) of the APA,
Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id.
See NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (Supp. 1999), and 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e) (1999); FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 
1732(a) (Supp. 1999), and 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3 (1999).
“ ^59F . Supp. 2d at 1088.
NEPA at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (Supp. 1999), 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (1999).
204 gg p Supp. 2d at 1089. Logging without the required surveys and thus without knowledge o f  the 
number and location o f critical species (like the northern spotted ow l and the red tree vole that the owl 
feeds on) may cause permanent harm to the species, and thus to the plaintiffs’ interests. Id.
Id. at 1090
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which he characterized as “an exception to the final agency action requirement.” ®̂®
ONRC stated that the agencies’ decision to authorize the timber sales without surveys 
constituted final agency actions under section 704 of the APA.̂ ®̂  Judge Dwyer also 
found the plaintiffs’ challenge to specific timber sales rendered the claim ripe in light of 
Ohio Forestry
Like Kentucky Heartwood, ONRC also stands for the proposition that procedural 
claims, including those based on FLPMA and NFMA as well as NEPA, should be 
considered ripe under Ohio Forestry. In addition, it finds that an agency decision to 
disregard the requirements of a LRMP is reviewable as a final agency action or failure to 
act for the purposes of the APA. Finally, Judge Dwyer’s opinion also demonstrates the 
perceived need for site-specific allegations in order to square this type of challenge with 
the mandates of Ohio Forestry, even when the claim is procedural in nature.
2. Sierra Club v. Martin
In Sierra Club v. Martin, environmental groups challenged the Forest Service’s 
approval of seven timber sales in the Chattahoochee and Oconee National Forests in the 
Appalachian Mountains of northern Georgia.̂ ®® The proposed timber sales would cover 
roughly 2000 acres, require the construction of eighteen miles of roads and release over 
155 tons o f sediment into nearby streams. '̂® The LRMP under which the timber sales 
were approved was adopted in 1985 and amended in 1989.^” Prior to any timber sale, the 
plan required the Forest Service to conduct a site-specific study to determine whether the
Id. (quoting ONRC v. BLM, 150 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9* Cir. 1998)).
Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)).
Id. (citing Martin, 168 F. 3d at 6 (11*  ̂Cir. 1999) (holding plaintiff was “entitled to challenge the Forest 
Service’s compliance with the [forest] Plan as part o f  its site-specific challenge to the timber sales”)).
168 F.3d 1 (11"' Cir. 1999) rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied by Sierra Club v. 
Martin, 181 F.3d 111 ( i f  Cir. 1999).
Id. at 2.
"'/4.
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sale would harm the area or resident species.^'^ After studying the area of the proposed 
sales, the Agency determined there would be no adverse impact and approved the sales/'^
The plaintiffs first alleged that the decision to approve the sales was arbitrary and 
capricious under the APA because the Service did not obtain or consider population data 
for sensitive species and species proposed or listed under the ESA, as required by the 
forest plan.^‘" Second, the plaintiffs claimed the failure to acquire population data 
violated NFMA’s 219 regulations as well/'^ The plaintiffs also challenged the forest 
plan itself, arguing that by allowing such timber harvests, it violated NFMA’s 
requirement that the plan adequately protect the soil, watershed, fish and wildlife o f the 
Forest/'^ The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that 
the Forest Service was not required to obtain population data before approving timber 
sales/'^
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit began with the first claim and 
refused to defer to the Forest Service’s conclusion that there will be no significant impact 
to the sensitive species. The court found agency actions must be reversed as arbitrary and 
capricious when the agency fails to “examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made.’” ‘̂* The court held the Service’s failure to gather the
Id. at 2-3.
M  at 3.
Id. The Sierra Club claimed the decision to proceed with the timber sales violated 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.19  
and 219.26 because the agency had not collected population data for MISs. Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. A ss’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) 
However, nothing in the record indicated that the Forest Service possessed baseline population data from 
which to measure the impacts on these species. Id.
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population data was contrary to the forest plan and therefore the decision to authorize the 
sales without the data was arbitrary and capricious/'^
In response to the second claim, the Forest Service argued that NFMA’s 219 
regulations could not be challenged at the site-specific level, because they apply only to 
the forest planning process/^" Further, the Agency argued that the plan itself was not a 
final agency action and could not be challenged/^' The court agreed that the regulations 
apply only to the planning process but noted that the planning process did not end with 
the plan’s approval, because NFMA’s implementing regulations require plan revision 
under various circumstances/^^ The 219 regulations, opined the court, taken together 
“require the Forest Service to gather quantitative data on MIS and use it to measure the 
impact o f habitat changes on the Forest’s diversity/^^ This, the court recognized, differs 
with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Inland Empire, that habitat viability analysis would 
satisfy the 219 regulations/^"
Without citing Ohio Forestry, the court also held the environmental groups could 
challenge the Forest Service’s compliance with its own LRMP as a part of their site- 
specific challenge to the timber sales/^^ The court recognized that a contrary result 
would make it impossible for a plaintiff to ever seek review of the Forest Service’s 
compliance with a Forest Plan/^^ Instead o f Ohio Forestry, the court relied on its own
Id. at 5. 
Id. at 6. 
Id.
Id.
223 Id. at 7. The court noted that to read the 219 regulations otherwise would render one or another 
meaningless “as w ell to disregard the regulations’ directive that population trends o f  the MIS be monitored 
and that inventory data be gathered in order to monitor the effects o f  the forest plan.” Id. citing Sierra Club 
V. Glickman, 974 F. Supp. 905, 936 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
Id. at 7, n. 10. The court did not believe the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion conformed with the plain 
language o f  36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(2), which requires evaluation o f  “both amount and quality o f  habitat and 
o f  animal population trends o f  the management indicator species.” Id.
Id.
Id.
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decision in Wilderness Society v. Alcock for the proposition that a court can hear a 
challenge to a Forest Plan once a site-specific action is proposed/^^ The decision did not 
address the Plaintiffs’ challenge to the plan itself.
Martin does not cite Ohio Forestry, but it does treat a Forest Service decision to 
ignore its own LRMP’s monitoring requirements, which derive from regulations 
implementing NFMA, as final for APA purposes. It is important to note that in Martin, 
the Eleventh Circuit did not uphold or declare ripe a challenge to the content of a LRMP. 
The court merely held that a claimant could seek review of the Forest Service’s 
compliance with a forest plan it had already adopted. While this court also requires a 
site-specific complaint, it does so in reliance on a case other than Ohio Forestry.
3. Sierra Club v. Peterson
Sierra Club v. Peterson {Peterson involved a fourteen-year dispute between 
environmental groups and the Forest Service over the management of four National 
Forests in eastern Texas.^^® In 1985, the environmental groups first challenged the Forest 
Service’s management o f these National Forests in response to the Agency’s cutting of 
timber in wilderness areas to control the spread of the Southern Pine Beetle.^^® In 1987, 
the groups’ efforts diverged into two distinct tracks of litigation.^^' The first involved 
claims that clearcutting violated NFMA and its associated regulations.”  ̂ The second 
involved attempts by the groups to protect the habitat of the Red-Cockaded
Id. (citing Wilderness S oc’y, 83 F.3d at 390).
^  185 F,3d 349 (5* Cir. 1999) (heareinafter Peterson I) reh’g en banc granted 204 F.3d 580 (5“' Cir. 2000) 
rev’d after rehearing en banc 228 F.3d 559 (5"' Cir. 2001).
Id. at 353. These forests are the Sam Houston, Davy Crockett, Angelina, and the Sabine, which cover 
639,000 acres in Texas, 
at 355.
Id. at 356.
Id.
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Woodpecker.^”  This case is the second-to-last stop on the first track.” '*
The environmental groups claimed that the Forest Service’s authorization of even- 
aged management teehniques (clearcutting) for several timber sales violated NFMA’s 
mandate that the Agency protect the diversity of plant and animal communities and 
protect resources in the National Forests.”  ̂ The Plaintiffs also argued the Service’s 
practices violated NFMA, the Agency’s implementing regulations, and the forests’
LRMP requirements o f inventorying and monitoring for diversity and resource 
protection.^”  The district court found it had jurisdiction to review the Forest Service’s 
failure to authorize timber sales in eompliance with NFMA and its regulations and 
concluded this failure was a final agency action for the purposes of the APA.^^  ̂ The 
Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits,”  ̂the district court enjoined future timber harvest until 
the Forest Service complied with NFMA, and the Agency and intervening timber 
interests appealed.^^^
After upholding the district court’s finding that the environmental groups had 
standing, the majority opinion in Peterson /  commenced a lengthy discussion o f ripeness 
and final agency action, in which it distinguished the case fi"om Lujan and Ohio
Id.
Id
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358 (citing Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F. Supp. 905, 914 (E.D. Tex. 1997)).
Specifically, the court determined that the Forest Service was violating its duties to protect; soil 
resources, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(3)(E)(i), (g)(3)(F)(v); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.27(a)(1), (b)(5), (c)(6), (f); 
and watershed resources, see  16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(3)(E)(i), (g)(3)(E)(iii), (g)(3)(F)(v); 36 C.F.R. §§ 
219.27(a)(1), (a)(4), (b)(5), (c)(6), (e), (f). See Sierra Club. 974 F.Supp. at 942. Additionally, the court 
found that the Forest Service was not inventorying and monitoring the following properly: wildlife, see 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(2)(B), (g)(3)(C); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.11(d), 219.12(d), (k), 219.19(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), 
(a)(6); diversity, see  36 C.F.R. §§ 219.26; and its success in meeting its objectives and adhering to its 
standards, see  36 C.F.R. §§ 219.12(k). 5ee Sierra Club, 974 F.Supp. at 942.
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Forestry}*^ Though the majority extolled the importance of the site-specific aspect of the 
challenge to satisfy Ohio Forestry and the ripeness doctrine, at one point its opinion 
characterized the Service’s decision not to follow the forest plan’s monitoring 
requirements (rather than the authorization of the timber sales) as the final agency action 
that rendered the claim justiciable.^'*' The majority recognized the Forest Service’s 
decision not to follow the inventory and monitoring requirements of the LRMP as an 
“adjudication” representing a “failure to act” which satisfies the “final agency action” 
requirement of the APA, as interpreted by Ohio Forestry
In Peterson /, a case virtually identical to Martin, the Fifth Circuit addressed the 
justiciability o f a challenge to the Forest Service’s authorization of timber sales without 
fulfilling its monitoring requirements.^"^ In fact, the Fifth Circuit expressly agreed with 
the holding and reasoning of its “sister circuit” in Martin}'^ While the Eleventh Circuit, 
in Martin, declined the opportunity to reconcile its holding with Ohio Forestry, the Fifth 
Circuit had no choice. In response to a vigorous dissent on the ripeness issue, the 
Peterson /  majority was forced to distinguish the instant case from Lujan and Ohio 
Forestry}'*^
First, the majority noted that in Lujan, “the plaintiffs challenged everything about 
the BLM's policies from soup to nuts, not a site-specific individual policy.” "̂̂  In 
Peterson I, the plaintiffs “pointed to specific activities on specific plots . .. and 
challenged the mechanism by which the Forest Service determined how to approve those
Id. at 361-73. The majority opinion indicates it might have avoided much this discussion had it not been 
for a vigorous dissent on the issue. Id.
Id. at 365-72.
Id.
185F .3d  349 (S'" Cir. 1999). 
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 362-64. 
Id. at 363.
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discrete logging practices.” '̂*’ The majority cited with approval Justice Scalia’s 
observation in Lujan that a case would be ripe where a specific final agency action has an 
actual or inunediately threatened effect which may require even a whole program to be 
revised by the agency to avoid an unlawful result. '̂**
Ohio Forestry, according to the majority, is both easily distinguished and 
supportive of finding this dispute ripe for review.^"*’ In Peterson I, the plaintiffs alleged 
the Forest Service violated its regulations and NFMA when it approved even-aged 
management on site-specific timber sales without fulfilling the LRMP’s requirement that 
management indicator species be inventoried or monitored in order to assess the impact 
of various harvesting t echniques .Whereas  in Ohio Forestry, no logging was yet 
authorized pursuant to the LRMP, and the Forest Service had not even reached the point 
of implementing its LRMP or NFMA “on-the-ground” when the suit was brought.^^’
Ohio Forestry supports, the majority opined, the proposition that “disagreements over 
final, specific action are necessarily ripe.”^̂^
Though the majority extolled the importance of the site-specific aspect of the 
challenge to satisfy Ohio Forestry and the ripeness doctrine, it characterized the Service’s 
decision not to follow the Forest Plan’s monitoring requirements (rather than the approval 
of the timber sales) as the final agency action that rendered the claim justiciable/^^ The 
majority recognized this decision as an “adjudication” representing a “failure to act” 
which satisfies the “final agency action” requirement of the APA, as interpreted by Ohio
Id.
Id. (citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 894). 
" ' M  at 363 n. 16.
Id.
Id. at 365-72.
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F o r e s t r y The majority summarized its reasoning for this characterization and the
propriety of the plaintiffs’ challenge as follows:
“The Forest Service determined that it would conduct timber sales from 
trees growing in Texas’s National Forests; it considered two alternative 
means of harvesting the trees -  even-aged and uneven-aged timber 
management; it was aware of the regulations that required it to inventory 
and to monitor species that would be affected by even-aged timber 
management practices; it affirmatively decided not to follow those 
regulations; it engaged in even-aged management; it conducted timber 
sales subsequent to those practices. When the Forest Service elected not to 
follow those regulations, it undertook a final agency action fo r the 
purposes o f  the inventorying and monitoring that the regulations 
prescribed. Failure to follow those regulations is what the Appellees 
challenged.”̂ ^̂
Peterson I  explicitly allows a single challenge to multiple timber sales without 
any discussion o f the different site-specific effects at the various and individual sales, 
further demonstrating that what is important is not the “on-the-ground” effects of the 
Service’s decision not to monitor, but the decision i t s e l f . I n  light of this 
characterization and the fact that the plaintiffs challenged the Service’s failure to follow 
the mandates of its forest plan rather than the plan itself, reliance on Ohio Forestry and 
the perceived need to distinguish or justify this decision seems unnecessary.
Peterson / / ”  stemmed from the Fifth Circuit’s decision to rehear the case en 
banc,^^* and resulted in a split decision with seven judges joining the majority opinion 
overturning Peterson /, and five judges dissenting.^^^ Relying mainly on Lujan v.
Id.
Id. at 370-71 (emphasis supplied).
185 F.3d at 370-72.
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 228 F.3d 559 (5* Cir. 2001) (hereinafter Peterson II).
204 F.3d 580 (5*̂  Cir. 2000).
Judges Jolly, Higginbotham, Davis, Jones, Smith, Barksdale, and DeM oss concurred in the majority 
opinion. Judge Higginbotham filed a separate concurrence. Judges Politz, Wiener, Benavides, and Deimis 
concurred in Judge Stewart’s dissent. C hief Judge King did not participate, and Judge Parker was recused 
and did not participate.
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National Wildlife Federations^ the majority held that the plaintiffs had not challenged 
specific final agency actions, but characterized the suit as a wholesale challenge to Forest 
Service practices in Texas, and stated this was “precisely the type of programmatic 
challenge the Supreme Court Struck down in LujanF^*’̂
The majority did recognize that plaintiffs also made site-specific challenges, but 
stated that alleging specific improper final agency actions within a program does not 
allow a plaintiff to challenge an entire program.^*^ The court somehow viewed as 
inapplicable in this case LujaWs statement that environmental groups can challenge “a 
specific ‘final agency action’ [which] has an actual or immediately threatened effect,” 
even when such a challenge has “the effect of requiring a regulation, a series of 
regulations, or even a whole ‘program’ to be revised by the agency.”^̂^
The majority also noted that the plaintiffs could not challenge the Agency’s 
failure to inventory or monitor because this was not a ‘final agency action’ fi-om which 
legal consequences f l owed .Fu r ther ,  the court held that this was not a justiciable 
‘failure to act,’ stating that “alleged failure to comply with the NFMA in maintaining 
Texas’s national forests does not reflect agency inaction,” as opposed to where the Forest 
Service has “failed to issue an LRMP or to conduct timber sales.” ®̂̂ The majority did not 
explain how failure to issue an LRMP, as required by NFMA, differs from a failure to 
inventory or monitor, as required by NFMA.
In a concurring opinion. Judge Higginbotham attempted to provide guidance to
-««497 U.S. 871 (1990).
228 F.3d at 566.
Id. at 567.
Id. (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 894).
Id. at note 11 (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733-34). 
Id. at 568.
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the trial court on remand/^^ “Regarding allegations and proof,” the Judge noted, 
“plaintiffs must allege and prove a specific timber sale will violate the law.” ®̂’ Regarding 
the remedy in such a case, he stated “a court may not enjoin an entire program . . . [b]ut a 
component of enjoining a discrete, challenged action is enjoining the conduct that makes 
the challenged actions illegal” which may prevent “future sales that share the 
illegality.”^̂ *
The dissent made three important points. First, it pointed out that the plaintiffs 
had “continuously identified specific agency actions which they allege violate the 
NFMA.^^^ Second, the dissent noted that the purpose of requiring a final agency action is 
to reduce the scope of the controversy to manageable proportions and flesh out factual 
components by looking at a concrete action that applies the regulation in a manner that 
harms the plaintiff.”  ̂ Finally, the dissent recognized that the case at bar was much more 
factually similar to SierraClub v. Martin^^^ which the majority cited with approval, than 
to Lujan
The strained reasoning of the Peterson //m ajority is at least partially a problem 
with requiring substantive allegations of site-specific harm where procedural illegalities 
are alleged. It primarily stems from the total lack of logic in limiting the number and 
scope of substantive allegations of site-specific harm under the doctrine of ripeness. The 
opinion ignores Ohio Forestry s explicit recognition that harm caused by a defect in the
Id. at 570.
Id. Further noting that “the trial court must find by a preponderance o f  the evidence, that the Forest 
Service w ill violate the law in executing or implementing the specific challenged timber sale.” Id. at 571. 
’“ /d. at 571.
Id. at 573 Illustrating this fact, the dissent notes that the district court was able to conduct a seven-day 
bench trial consisting largely o f  evidence focused on specific sales and parcels o f  land. Id.
"™ Id. (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890, and noting that this is exactly what the plaintiffs in this case did). 
168 F.3d 1 (ll'^C ir. 1999).
Id.
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plan, will allow review of that portion of the plan.
Though Peterson //never reaches questions of agency discretion or the merits 
because it is decided on the jurisdictional issue of ripeness, even a cursory reading of the 
opinion suggests the presence of two guilty parties. The Forest Service is guilty of 
ignoring the mandates of NFMA throughout Texas’s forests, and the judges responsible 
for the majority opinion are guilty of rendering an ill-considered and illogical opinion.
4. Ecology Center, Inc. v. United States Forest Service 
Ecology Center, Inc. v. United States Forest Service involved a challenge to a 
Forest Service decision not to follow the monitoring requirements of its LRMP for the 
Kootenai National Forest in Northwest Montana.^’  ̂ This challenge was similar to 
Peterson, but the plaintiff complained of no site-specific timber sales made under the 
Plan.™ In a brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Ecology 
Center’s action, holding that the challenge was not ripe for adjudication since the Forest 
Service’s failure to perform certain monitoring tasks was not a final agency action or a 
justiciable failure to act under the APA as interpreted by Ohio Forestry
The Plaintiff challenged, under the APA, the Forest Service’s failure to comply 
with monitoring duties imposed by NFMA, its implementing regulations, and the 
Kootenai National Forest Plan.̂ ^® The plan was adopted in 1987 and requires the Agency 
to produce annual, biannual and five-year reports containing monitoring data for 
recreation trends, wildlife habitat and populations, species listed under the ESA, and the 
like.^’’ In 1996, the Ecology Center filed suit alleging the Agency failed to publish the
192 F.3d 922 (9* Cir. 1999). 
"'A /
Id. at 926.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 924.
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required reports in 1988 and 1993, and the required monitoring was insufficient in the 
reports it did file.^’* The Forest Service acknowledged its failure to publish reports for 
those two years and admitted that the reports it did publish contained inadequate data for 
some parameters.^^^ However, the magistrate judge for the district court never reached 
the merits of the dispute but dismissed the action for lack of ripeness.^®”
For the Ninth Circuit, resolution of the jurisdiction issue hinged on whether the 
Agency’s failure to adequately monitor was either a final agency action or an action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed under the APA/®' The court classified 
monitoring and reporting as advisory steps leading to an agency decision/®^ The court 
recognized that the duty to monitor was mandatory, but relying on Ohio Forestry, found 
that legal consequences did not flow, nor did rights or obligations arise fi'om that duty/®^ 
Ohio Forestry, the court suggested, requires plaintiffs to withhold their challenge until “a 
time when harm is more imminent and more certain.” ®̂"
While the Plaintiffs complaint did not allege imminent harm from a site-specific 
activity, the Ecology Center argued that it suffered actionable injury because the 
inadequate monitoring deprived it of information necessary to effective oversight of 
Agency activities provided for by NFMA/®^ The court countered that NFMA does not 
provide for public oversight of monitoring, only of the formation, amendment and 
revision ofLRMPs/®^ The Plaintiffs argued denial of this claim would essentially
"'AT
Id.
Id. at 924-26.
Id. at 925.
-*■' Id. (quoting Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734). 
Id. at 925.
Id. at 926 n. 7.
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prevent judicial review of inadequate monitoring by the A g e n c y T h e  court stated that 
such claims would be justiciable when linked to an APA challenge to a final agency 
action like a timber sale.^^*
The court then addressed the Ecology Center’s claim that the failure to monitor 
was ripe for review under section 706(1) of the APA as an agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.^*^ This provision of the APA, the court maintained, 
applies only when there is a genuine failure to act, and not when the Forest Service 
“merely failed to conduct its duty in strict conformance with the plan and NFMA 
regulations.”^̂®
Ecology Center is a challenge similar to the Martin and Peterson cases, except the 
plaintiff complained of no site-specific timber sales made under the plan.^®‘ Ecology 
Center demonstrates unnecessary application of Ohio Forestry in a case similar to Martin 
and Peterson, where the challenge was not to a LRMP, but to the Forest Service’s failure 
to follow the Plan’s requirements. The decision also illustrates the perceived necessity 
for allegations of site-specific injury, like a timber sale, upon which the court can base a 
finding of imminent harm. This requirement seems misplaced when the plaintiff s claim 
in this case could easily be characterized as a claim of procedural harm, which even Ohio 
Forestry recognizes to be ripe upon occurrence, and not dependent on further allegations 
of site-specific harm. The Agency’s failure to follow its own procedures, which are 
mandated by the Forest Plan, will prevent effective amendment and revision of the Plan,
Id. at 926 n. 6.
Id. at 926 (citing Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F 3d 1146, 1153 (9* Cir. 1998) (allowing a 
challenge to a timber sale on grounds that the Forest Service violated its forest plan when it failed to 
monitor trout populations in a stream affected by the sale)).
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id.
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as well as informed resource allocation decisions like timber sales.
Ecology Center ignores the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, in Wyoming Outdoor 
Council, that where an agency promulgates regulations that erect a procedural barrier and 
then ignores them, the plaintiff need only show that the government act performed 
without the procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a particularized interest of 
the p l a i n t i f f . Ecology Center also runs counter to Wyoming Outdoor Center's 
recognition of the procedural nature and ripeness o f an agency decision to ignore its own 
implementing regulations. By finding an agency decision to ignore the procedural 
requirements o f its own regulations ripe for review, the D.C. Circuit implied that such a 
decision is a final agency action or failure to act under the APA.
Ecology Center also conflicts with other cases in the Ninth Circuit, The opinion 
in Wilderness Society, contrary to the holding in Ecology Center, suggests that 
noncompliance with the mandates of a forest plan is a final agency action or a justiciable 
failure to act for purposes of the APA. Finally, in Friends O f The Kalmiopsis, the Ninth 
Circuit relied on Ohio Forestry and expressly stated that such claims would be ripe if the 
Forest Service made the harm more imminent by taking site-specific action based on 
inadequate monitoring. While the Ecology Center failed to challenge a site-specific 
activity, the Forest Service made timber sales throughout the forest, in the absence of 
monitoring data.
F. Conclusion
The Ohio Forestry decision is a serious blow to environmental plaintiffs, and it is 
tempting to read its holding as closing the courthouse door to all challenges to LRMPs. 
However, more careful inspection of the dicta reveals that the Court left two doors open.
Id. (quoting Florida Audubon Soc’y  v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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and study o f the subsequent case law shows that plaintiffs in lower court decisions after 
Ohio Forestry have taken advantage of these doors.
First, Ohio Forestry reaffirmed, from Lujan, the justiciability of challenges to 
LRMPs based on claims of procedural harm. Though Ohio Forestry explicitly recognizes 
only procedural claims brought under NEPA, subsequent cases show that such claims are 
also viable under NFMA, FLPMA, and the ESA. Second, Justice Breyer’s opinion also 
affirms the ripeness o f claims for injuries that are not contingent on a timber sale, or some 
other activity that requires a second stage of decision making.
However, it is doubtful that challenges to LRMPs based on such claims will result 
in wholesale review of the entire plan. Rather, language in Ohio Forestry along with 
prior and subsequent cases suggest courts will review only portions of the plan with a 
causal relationship to the harm. It should also be noted that Ohio Forestry and 
subsequent cases treat ripeness as a prudential and discretionary limitation on the 
justiciability of claims. Therefore, courts may vary in their application of the doctrine to 
different LRMPs.
Cases interpreting Ohio Forestry have generally recognized that the prudential 
concerns of ripeness are satisfied both by challenges to procedural requirements and 
claims of imminent harm not contingent on the outcome of further agency 
decisionmaking. These cases also demonstrate that courts give Ohio Forestry’s 
requirement o f site-specific allegations of harm talismanic significance even in the 
absence of a rational basis for such a requirement, and contrary to the language of Ohio 
Forestry.
Application of the Ohio Forestry requirement of site-specific allegations is 
unwarranted in challenges brought against the Forest Service for failure to properly
50
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follow or implement LRMP monitoring requirements, because such challenges are only 
tangentially related to Ohio Forestry and are easily distinguishable for the simple fact that 
they are not substantive challenges to forest plans. Reliance on Ohio Forestry in such 
cases is problematic at best, and is likely to continue to lead to inconsistent and unfair 
decisions like Ecology Center, and Peterson II.
If anything, Ohio Forestry and Lujan stand for the proposition that cases 
regarding a failure to properly monitor or otherwise follow LRMP guidelines do not 
require allegations of site-specific harm. While Ohio Forestry equated procedural 
challenges with NEPA, subsequent cases have recognized that claims brought under 
NFMA, FLPMA, and the ESA may also be procedural in nature. Ohio Forestry's 
statement that challenges to an agency’s failure to follow procedural requirements are 
necessarily ripe, assumes that such a failure constitutes a “final agency action” or an 
action “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” for purposes of the APA.
Monitoring requirements, imposed by regulations implementing NFMA, and 
forest plans prepared pursuant to those regulations, are essentially procedural 
requirements. Like NEPA, monitoring requirements guarantee particular procedures, not 
specific results. The injury inflicted by an agency’s failure to monitor is similar to the 
Ninth Circuit’s description of injuries occasioned by a failure to follow NEPA 
requirements -  the risk that environmental impacts will be ov e r l o o k e d . I f  the failure to 
monitor is properly characterized as a procedural claim, Ohio Forestry and Lujan stand 
for the proposition that site-specific allegations are unnecessary.
Absent the misplaced requirements of site-specific allegations of harm, Peterson 
/, Martin, and ONRC demonstrate more workable resolutions of agencies’ failures to
Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1514.
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properly follow mandatory regulations. These decisions explicitly recognize that agency 
decisions to ignore their own regulations are reviewable under the APA as final agency 
actions or failures to act. However, the requirement of site-specific allegations are 
unnecessary when the claim is properly characterized as procedural, because the failure to 
follow procedure is the injury, and the results of the procedural misstep do not need to be 
fleshed out to demonstrate harm. When a statute guarantees that certain information will 
be considered in rendering a decision, failure to consider that information prior to the 
decision is the illegal act and the resultant harm.
Further, when the missing information is ecological monitoring data, making 
decisions without it will effect not only specific timber sales, but the entire forest 
ecosystem. This is because information regarding species population in one area of a 
forest should effect management decisions made elsewhere that also impact that species. 
For example, monitoring data which chronicles the effect of a certain management 
decision on a species in one forest, should be considered in making a similar decision in 
another forest, or even in different areas of the same forest. Also, a management decision 
to allow limited destruction of a species’ habitat through timber harvest on one parcel of 
land, would likely be different if population data showed that in fact the population 
inhabiting another parcel of suitable habitat was smaller in number, and the timber 
harvest would constitute an impact on the overall population that the species may not 
recover from.
On the other hand. Ecology Center and Peterson II  represent overly restrictive 
readings of Ohio Forestry that allow the Forest Service to ignore its own LRMPs and 
thereby violate the sprit and letter of the environmental acts that require these plans to 
guide all activities in our national forests. Until the effect of Ohio Forestry on such cases
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is clarified, environmental plaintiffs can protect their claims by including challenges to 
site-specific actions. A requirement o f site-specific activity in these cases elevates form 
over function and it is doubtful the Supreme Court intended such an interpretation or 
result.
IV. Standard of Review -  Agency Deference and the Hard Look Doctrine
A. Introduction
Even in cases where environmental plaintiffs’ failure to monitor claims have 
surmounted the initial procedural hurdle regarding justiciability or ripeness, a second 
hurdle remains — agency deference. Agency deference influences the standard o f review 
or level of scrutiny that a court applies to challenged agency action or inaction.
Generally, the more deferential the standard, the harder it is for environmental plaintiffs 
to prove to the reviewing court that the agency decision violates the applicable law or 
regulation. However, even under the same standard o f review, courts have enough 
wiggle room to come to different conclusions as to whether or not an agency action is 
unlawful.
This chapter discusses the appropriate standard of review in monitoring cases.
The first section provides background information on the standard of review and agency 
deference. The second section examines the arbitrary and capricious standard, and how it 
might apply to challenges regarding agency failures to gather appropriate population data. 
In the third section, this chapter compares the two primary federal court cases addressing 
the Forest Service’s failure to gather population data under the current NFMA 
regulations. Finally this chapter concludes that even under the most deferential standard, 
a failure to gather actual population data should itself be considered an unlawful decision, 
and any timber harvest or other resource decision made in the absence of such data is also
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illegal.
B. Background
In its 1984 opinion in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the long-standing conflict 
concerning the proper scope of judicial review of agency interpretations of statutory 
provisions.” " In Chevron, the Court announced a two-prong standard of review for 
determining whether a federal agency’s interpretation and construction of a statute is 
permissible.”  ̂ Under Chevron, courts must first determine whether Congress has 
unambiguously expressed its intent on an interpretive issue.”  ̂If  the intent of Congress is 
clear, then the court must give effect to that intent, because the courts must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” ’̂  ̂The second step provides that if 
Congress was silent or ambiguous on an interpretive issue, a reviewing court must 
exercise limited review and may not “simply impose its own construction on the statute 
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.” ’̂* “Rather,” 
the Court continued, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”” ’
Thus, the Chevron Court distinguished between two situations. In the first. 
Congress explicitly directed the agency to promulgate regulations, by leaving a “gap” for 
the agency to fill.” ’ When this occurs, “there is an express delegation of authority to the
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Id. at 842-43.
^  Id. at 843.
* 7 / 4 .
* « / 4.
Id. at 843-44.
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agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,” and “[s]uch 
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary to the statute.” ®̂* The second situation occurs when Congress’s 
legislative grant of authority to an agency is “implicit rather than explicit.” “̂  In that 
case, the reviewing court must uphold the agency’s interpretation so long as it is 
“reasonable.” ®̂̂
As noted above, the statutory provisions which give rise to the Forest Service’s 
duty to monitor species populations include certain provisions of NEPA and NFMA.
Both of these statutes explicitly grant federal agencies the authority to promulgate 
regulations to implement their provisions.^^ Thus, failure to monitor cases will generally 
fit under the first situation in Chevron. Further, since neither NEPA, nor NFMA contain 
provisions for judicial review, such review is accomplished through the APA, which 
provides the standard of review for agency actions is whether they are “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” ”̂̂
Considering the foregoing, it is no surprise that federal courts review Forest 
Service monitoring procedures under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard. Despite the 
broad discretion granted agencies under this standard, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard o f review is not entirely toothless. Courts can and have held arbitrary and 
capricious the Forest Service’s failure to gather actual population data, among other 
inadequate agency procedures and decisions.
Id. at 844.
See supra  notes 29-38 and accompanying text regarding NEPA; and notes 39-56 and accompanying text 
regarding NFMA.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2){A).
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C. Arbitrary and Capricious - A Not-entirely-toothless Standard
In a line o f cases, beginning with Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, the 
Supreme Court delineated the scope of this standard of review/^^ In Overton Park, the 
Court was asked to scrutinize a decision by the Secretary o f Transportation to release 
federal funds to the Tennessee highway department for construction of a six-lane 
interstate highway through a Memphis public park.̂ ®̂  After finding that arbitrary and 
capricious was the proper standard of review under the APA, the Court stated that the 
presumption of the validity of the Secretary’s decision inherent in this standard “is not to 
shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.” "̂® Rather, the Court found 
the APA required determination o f “whether the decision was based on a consideration of 
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error o f judgment.” ®̂̂ The Court 
continued that “this inquiry into the facts is to be searching an careful.” '̂®
This explanation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, and the 
requirement that an agency consider detailed information, came to be known as the “hard 
look” doctrine after the Supreme Court decided Kleppe v. Sierra Club in 1976/" In 
Kleppe, the Court considered whether the Department o f the Interior and other federal 
agencies should have to prepare a region-wide, comprehensive environmental impact 
statement prior to allowing development o f coal reserves on federally owned or
*“ 401 U.S. 4 0 2 (1 9 7 1 ).
Id.
*“  M. at 415.
Id. at 416 (internal citations omitted).
Id
*" 427 U .S. 390 (1976). Judge Leventhal is given credit for formulation o f  the doctrine stating that a court 
must “satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion with reasons that do not deviate 
from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent. See  Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking  
and the Role o f  the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. R ev. 509, 514 (1974) (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. 
V. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C.Cir. 1970)).
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controlled land in the Northern Great Plains/'^ The Court said that it should not 
substitute its judgment for that o f the Agency, but should “insure that the agency has 
taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences.” ’̂̂
In 1983, the Supreme Court further fleshed out the hard look doctrine and scope 
o f review of agency actions.^"’ Agency actions are unlawful under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard if the agency “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” 
has “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency,” or has not articulated “a rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.” '̂̂
While hard look review has gained general acceptance in federal courts, it is not 
without its detractors. One commentator suggested that “techno-bureaucratic rationality,’ 
rather than “comprehensive analytical rationality,” is the appropriate mode of 
decisionmaking for agencies as well as corporations, and that “hard look” review is 
inconsistent with this mode of decisionmaking.  ̂  ̂ This commentator believes that “hard 
look” review aims for an ideal o f “comprehensive analytical rationality” that is 
impossible for an agency to achieve, due to “inadequate data, unquantifiable values, 
mixed societal goals, and political realities.” ’̂’
Other commentators recognize the difficulties presented by such pragmatic
Id.
Id. at 410 n.21 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 
1972)).
Motor Vehicle Mfr. A ss’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Id  at 43.
Mark Seidenfeld, H ard Look R eview  in a World o f  Techno-Bureaucratic Decisionmaking: A Reply to 
Professor M cGarity, 75 TEX. L REV. 559, 559-60 (1997) (citing Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the 
Ossification o f  Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 T e x . L . R e v . 525, 537-39 (1997) 
(stating that the evidentiary requirements which must be satisfied for agencies to satisfy hard look review  
prevents agencies from taking a techno-bureaucratic approach - one that emphasizes political as well as 
scientific considerations)).
Id. at 563.
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constraints, but also recognize that “hard look” review is essential to help agencies make 
appropriate decisions in spite o f such pressures.^'* Hard look review can help agencies 
recognize that its choices often involve values, and can help avoid taking inappropriate 
shortcuts to satisfy value judgments/'^ Active judicial review of an agency’s 
decisionmaking process can also give agency staff the incentive and power to resist 
political pressure from superiors to reach preordained results/^^ It can force 
consideration of concerns voiced by those outside the lead agency, like other agencies 
and public interest g r o u p s . I t  can force the agency to consider other alternatives or 
different decisional criteria, to ask whether additional data or analysis is necessary, and to 
consult with those who might not share its “potentially provincial professional 
perspective.”^̂ ^
Adding to the debate regarding the propriety of current embodiment o f the hard 
look doctrine, others argue that courts should extend the doctrine to include evaluation of 
the accuracy and integrity of the scientific evidence considered in agency decisions.^^^ 
Examining the issue in the NEPA context, one commentator suggested that federal courts 
can and should conduct such evaluations, given the CEQ regulation’s requirement that 
agencies rely on high-quality s c i en c e , a n d  the Supreme Court’s express recognition, in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, of the judicial duty to evaluate the
Id. at 563-66. 
at 565.
Id.
Id. Seidenfeld goes on to chronicle evidence that hard look review provides these benefits. Id. at 565- 
68 .
See  Patricia Smith King, Applying D aubert to the "Hard Look" Requirement o f  NEPA: Scientific 
Evidence Before the Forest Service in Sierra Club v. M arita, 2 WlS. E n v t l .  L. J. 147, 156 (1995).
See supra  note 38 and accompanying text. NFM A also contains provisions intended to promote use o f  
up-to-date and high-quality science. See supra  note 48 and accompanying text.
113 S. Ct. 2786(1993).
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admissibility of scientific evidence/^''
For years, general acceptance was the only criterion used by courts in evaluating 
scientific evidence/^^ In Daubert, the Court held this judicially created test was 
superceded by the adoption of the Federal Rules o f Evidence, and interpreted those rules 
to require additional considerations, including; testability, peer review and publication, 
and known or potential rate o f error.^^* These guidelines are flexible, based on the 
scientific method, and intended for courts to use in assessing whether the reasoning or 
methodology underlying proffered evidence is scientifically valid (i.e. reliable), and 
whether it can be applied to the facts in issue (i.e. relevant).^^’
Though Daubert addressed the proper standard for admissibility of scientific 
testimony at trial, some argue the same standard can and should be applied to the 
question of the validity o f scientific evidence before an administrative a g e n c y . T h e  last 
of the Daubert criteria, known or potential rate of error, goes primarily to questions 
concerning the reliability o f specific measurement techniques, and could be readily 
applied to assess the reliability of the Forest Service’s habitat viability analysis, compared 
to that of the more traditional methods of population viability analysis. Despite 
numerous federal court opinions stating that judges do not have the requisite expertise to 
evaluate agency choices of methodology, the Court in Daubert said, “we are confident 
that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.”^̂ ' Indeed, as the 
following section will show, some federal judges have done just that.
King, supra  note 321 at 156.
Frye v. United States, 239 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
113 S. Ct. at 2786, and 2796-97.
Id. at 2796-97.
330 1King, supra  note 321 at 153. 
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
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D. Deference in Species Monitoring Cases
1. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest 
Service
In 1996, Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Service 
directly confronted the Ninth Circuit with the question of whether habitat viability 
analysis satisfied NFMA’s biodiversity requirement, or whether collecting and 
monitoring actual population data was needed.”  ̂ The case arose in the Kootenai National 
Forest in northwestern Montana, when the Forest Service produced an EIS and Biological 
Opinion addressing the effects of eight timber sales on the surrounding environment and 
resident wildlife, and subsequently approved the sales, all without gathering actual 
population data.^”  After unsuccessful administrative appeals, the environmental group 
filed suit and lost when the district court granted summary judgment to the Forest 
Service, characterizing the case as a dispute over the agency’s choice of scientific 
methodology/^'* The environmental groups appealed claiming that the agency’s failure to 
collect actual population data violated NFMA and section 219.19 of the implementing 
regulations.^^^
The Ninth Circuit recognized that while 219.19 applies to forest planning rather 
than site-specific management activities, the site-specific activities must comply with the 
forest plan.”  ̂ Using the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the court said it 
would uphold the agency’s use of habitat viability analysis unless it was “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent” with section 219.19.^^’ The court also stressed that it would
88 F.3d 754 (9'" Cir. 1996) 
Id. at 758.
334 Id.
Id. at 759. 
Id. at 760, 
"7 A t
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not overturn this approach even if another may have been preferable.” *
Thus under the banner of agency deference, the court allowed the Forest Service 
to rely on the broad assumptions underlying habitat viability analysis, finding that 
analysis which “uses all the scientific data currently available is a sound one.”” ® The 
court based this finding on the plaintiffs admission that alternative approaches can be 
used where population-specific information is not available, and on a Ninth Circuit 
decision upholding a viability analysis that was “based on the current state of scientific 
knowledge.”” ®
The court then addressed the application of section 219.19 to management 
indicator species (MIS), misstating that section’s requirement of selection of appropriate 
MIS as permissive.” ' However, the court did quote language fi-om section 219.19(a)(2) 
which obligates the agency to evaluate management alternatives’ effects on population 
trendŝ "*̂  -  an obligation that cannot be fulfilled without actual population data. The court 
continued that it did not believe the Forest Service acted arbitrarily or capriciously when 
it estimated the effects of the alternatives on the population of MIS by analyzing the 
effect of the alternative on MIS habitat.” ^
Taking this stretch a step further, the court finds the same analysis supports the 
conclusion that the Forest Service satisfied its obligations under section 219.19(a)(6), 
which states that “[pjopulation trends of the [MIS] will be monitored and relationships to 
habitat determined.”'*”  In so ruling, the court relies on the agency’s finding that there is
Id. at 761 n. 8.
Id. at 762 (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9* Cir. 1996). 
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763.
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no technically reliable and cost-effective method of counting individual members of 
species like the pileated woodpecker . Impliedly recognizing the mandatory nature of 
the duty to monitor MIS populations under section 219.19, the court concludes that “[i]n 
light of the Service’s alternative method of population trend analysis, its failure to 
monitor the actual population of the pileated woodpecker is not dispositive or 
unreasonable.” '̂*̂
There are several flaws in the reasoning of the Inland Empire court. First, the 
court upholds as reasonable the assumption underlying habitat viability analysis, without 
any supporting evidence that wildlife populations remain viable in the face of widespread 
timber harvesting simply because a number of trees are left standing.^"*’ This runs 
contrary to the hard look doctrine’s requirement that an agency support it’s decision with 
a rational connection to known facts.
Second, despite the courts misstatement as to the permissiveness of the MIS 
requirement, the opinion seems to recognize the mandatory nature of gathering actual 
population data once MIS are selected. However, the court allows the agency to shirk 
this duty on the basis of an unsupported Forest Service finding that there is no reliable or 
cost-effective method for counting MIS like the one chosen in this case -  the pileated 
woodpecker. The assertion that there was no reliable method to count these animals in 
1996 is highly suspect. Further, nothing in the regulations suggests cost-effectiveness 
should affect this duty. Besides, the fact remains that there was no support for these 
assertions, again contrary to the hard look requirement.
Finally, the characterization of the agency’s habitat viability analysis as being
Id.
347 See Orlemann, supra note 23 at 365.
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based on the “current state of scientific knowledge” suggests that this is the best the 
agency can do — another dubious assertion. The court also seems to place some emphasis 
on the fact that because actual population data is not currently available, use of habitat 
viability analysis, based on readily available information, is reasonable. The reasoning is 
circular, finding that the agency’s failure to gather the actual population data justifies 
their continuing failure to gather that same data.
2. Sierra Club v. Martin 
Martin, like Inland Empire, involved an appeal of a district court decision which 
granted summary judgment to the Forest Service, holding that the agency was not 
required under section 219.19 to collect actual population data before approving specific 
timber sales, and therefore, that the Forest Service did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously.^^* On appeal, the Sierra Club argued that in conducting the biological 
evaluation (BE) and environmental analysis (EA) for the proposed timber sales, the 
Forest Service was required by the forest plan and its own regulations to collect baseline 
population data on proposed, endangered, threatened and sensitive species of plants and 
animals (PETS species).^"’ Sierra Club also argued that the decision to approve the sales 
violated sections 219.12, 219.19, and 219.26 of the implementing regulations, because 
the Forest Service laeked the population data required by those regulations as welL*̂ *̂
In response to the first argument, the Forest Service acknowledged that PETS 
species do occur within the project areas and that individuals would be destroyed by 
timber harvest.*^' The agency argued that because those species also exist elsewhere
^  Martin, 168 F.3d at 3, See supra  notes 207-25 and accompanying text for additional facts and 
procedural background.
Id. at 4.
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within the forest, the timber sales would not significantly impact the species’ diversity or 
v i a b i l i t y T h e  court notes that the Service reached this conclusion without gathering 
any inventory or population data on many PETS species, and that nothing in the record 
indicated that the agency possessed baseline population data from which to measure the 
impact destruction of PETS species in the project area would have on overall 
populations.^”
Responding to the Forest Service’s request that the court defer to its conclusion 
that the timber sales will not have a significant impact on PETS species populations, the 
court states that it cannot do so absent support in the record for these assertions.” '* The 
court continues, stating that in this case the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
that it failed to “examine relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action, including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”’”  ̂
Further, the court found that contrary to the agency’s argument, the forest plan does 
require collection of population inventory information, and that the information the 
Service deems “adequate,” is actually “no information at all in terms of many of the 
PETS species.”” * Since the agency’s position was contrary to the clear language of the 
plan, the court found that it was entitled to no deference at all.^”
The court then considered the Sierra Club’s argument that approval of the timber 
sales violated NFMA’s implementing regulations because the Forest Service failed to 
collect actual population data for MIS (as required by section 219.19), and for “all
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. (quoting M otor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass 463 U.S. at 43). 
Id. at 5.
" 'A t
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affected species” (as required by sections 219.26 and 219.12).^^® The agency countered 
that the section 219.19 does not explicitly require the agency to gather data on MIS, 
merely to monitor population trends and determine relationships to habitat changes.® ’̂ 
Also, the Service contended that to interpret sections 219.26 and 219.12 to require data be 
kept on “all affected species” makes nonsense out the concept of MIS.
The court agreed with the Forest Service that the regulations, when read together, 
require only collection of inventory data on MIS.®*’ However, the court found the 
Service’s argument actual population data was not required to be inconsistent with the 
plain language of the regulations, stating that “[i]t is implicit that population data must be 
collected before it can be monitored and its relationships determined,” and that before 
inventories of quantitative data can be used to evaluate the effect of management 
alternatives on forest diversity (as required by section 219.26), those inventories “have to 
be collected.”®*® To read these regulations otherwise, the court noted, would be to rob 
them of all meaning, contrary to the established rules of statutory construction.®*®
In finding the agency’s failure to gather actual population data on MIS violated 
sections 219.19 and 219.26, the court quoted Sierra Club v. Glickman to support the 
position that “[t]he unambiguous language of the MIS regulations requires collection of 
population data.”®*̂ In a footnote, the court stated that “we respectfully differ with Ninth 
Circuit’s conclusion in Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 761, that habitat analyses suffice to 
satisfy the requirements of 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 . . .  which requires evaluation o f ‘both
Id. at 5-6. See supra note 49 and accompanying text regarding the 219 regulations.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7 (citing Scott v. City o f  Hammond, Ind., 741 F.2d 992, 998 (7'*' Cir. 1984) (noting a strong 
presumption against agency interpretation that renders a statute “wholly ineffective”)).
Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F.Supp. 905, 936 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
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amount and quality of habitat and of animal population trends of the The
Martin court did recognize, however, that in Inland Empire, the Forest Service had 
conducted a more in-depth EIS and “detailed field studies,” as opposed to the less 
involved EA and BE conducted in this case.^^ In concluding that Forest Service 
approval of timber sales without gathering and considering population data on MIS is 
arbitrary and capricious, the court stated that since the agency had no population data for 
half of the MIS in the forest, it could not “reliably gauge the impact of the timber projects 
on these species.”^̂ ^
In Martin, the Eleventh Circuit addressed and corrected many of the 
shortcomings, as discussed above, in the Ninth Circuit’s Inland Empire decision. 
Primarily, Martin's reading of the regulations is more logical, recognizing that their plain 
language requires collection of actual population data, and without it, the regulations are 
meaningless and their purpose is frustrated. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes 
that the hard look doctrine mandates that an agency articulate a reasoned and supportable 
basis for its management decisions, and that a decision made in the absence of data to 
support it, is unreasonable.^^*
3. Sierra Club v. Glickman (affirmed by Peterson I)
Sierra Club v. Glickman {Glickman), the predecessor of the Peterson decisions, 
involved the environmental group’s challenge to Forest Service management practices in 
Texas’s national f o r e s t s .A m o n g  numerous complaints was the plaintiffs’ contention 
that the Forest Services habitat viability approach and consequent failure to gather actual
Id. at n. 10.
“ ’ M  at 7.
368 See Orlemann, supra note 23 at 370. 
Glickman, 974 F.Supp. at 911.
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population data was arbitrary and capricious and not in compliance with NFMA’s 
diversity provision or the implementing regulations under section 219.̂ ™ In what is by 
far the most exhaustive treatment of this issue in a federal court decision or elsewhere, the 
court finds for the plaintiffs and enjoins the agency from conducting friture timber harvest 
until further order of the court/^'
In rendering its decision, the court first finds that section 219.19 mandates both 
selection of MIS and monitoring of their populations.^’̂  The court also finds that an 
interpretation of the regulations “requiring collection of population data [is] consistent 
with the NFMA that requires collection of inventory data.” ’̂  ̂ The Forest Service’s 
interpretation of section 219.19, the court notes, requires only habitat for MIS, rather than 
collection of population data on MIS.^’'' Then the court recognized Inland Empire's 
validation of that interpretation, stating, “[t]he court reasoned that the Forest Service’s 
central assumption was reasonable, i.e., that ‘maintaining the acreage of habitat necessary 
for survival would in fact assure [sic] a species’ s u r v i v a l . T h e  Glickman court 
expressly disagreed with Inland Empire, stating that the “decision does not support the 
Forest Service’s interpretation,’’ and that “the assumption that merely providing habitat 
will ensure viable populations of MIS and relieve the Forest Service of collecting 
population data is not reasonable.’’̂ ’  ̂ While scientific analysis requires making certain
/(/. at 931-46.
372 Id. at 936-37 (quoting 36 C.F.R § 219.19(a)(1) “In order to estimate the effects o f  each alternative on 
fish and wildlife populations, [MIS] . .  . shall be identified and selected. . . and 36 C.F.R. 219.19(a)(6) 
“Populations trends o f the [MIS] will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes identified.”).
Id. at 937 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(2)(B); and Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F.Supp. 1291, 
1316 (W.D. Wash. 1994) a ff  d sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (stating that 
“[t]he viability regulation [section 219.19] requires the agencies to look to species populations -  not 
merely to habitat for hypothetical populations.”)).
Id. (quoting Inland Empire 88 F.3d at 761).
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assumptions, noted the court, “the scientific method requires testing and verification of
those assumptions from time to time,” and “[cjontinually testing assumptions upon which
forest management decisions are based is exactly what Congress had in mind when it
required the Forest Service to collect inventory data.” ’̂’
The court based its disapproval of this use of habitat viability analysis in part on
the Agency’s own communications regarding the methodology. The Forest Service’s
1992 Five Year Review discusses HABCAP,” * the computer model on which habitat
viability analysis depends, and reads;
* * Important Note: HABCAP does not or should not be used to derive 
wildlife target projections, populations, or estimates. Many other factors 
effect populations that are not considered within HABCAP. HABCAP 
merely serves to assess the potential for specific population based on 
habitat availability in an area. The value of actual population monitoring 
for effectiveness or validation of assumptions in land management cannot 
be stressed enough as its importance in the overall [management indicator]
379process.
This same review stated that “HABCAP detects trends in habitat capability but not 
population or population trends,” and an EIS prepared for the forest in 1996 noted that 
these models “track capability rather than presence.” *̂*’
The court determined that the Forest Service’s interpretation of section 219.19 is 
“plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulation itself and section 1604(g)(2)(B)” 
of NFMA.^*' In order to comply with its statutory mandate and act within its discretion 
in evaluating diversity, the court finds that the Forest Service must adequately inventory 
and monitor properly selected MIS, as well as tree and plant species, if not adequately
Id.
HABCAP, an acronym for habitat capability, is a computer generated model that utilizes habitat 
management and condition to assess the capability o f  the forest to support certain species that require a 
readily definable forest type and age class. Id. at 932.
Id  at 932-33.
Id  at 933.
Id. at 938.
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represented among
On appeal in Peterson I, the Forest Service argued that the fact finding done by 
the Glickman court was improper and that the court had improperly engaged in de novo 
review.^®  ̂ Fifth Circuit upheld the Glickman decision, finding that the district court 
correctly employed the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, that its conduct of 
additional fact-finding was proper, and that its decision was warranted by the facts/®'' 
When Peterson /  was reheard en banc and vacated, the Peterson //court decided the case 
on the procedural issue of ripeness, and thus never reached or discussed the holdings of 
Peterson I  or Glickman regarding the monitoring issue/®^
4. ONRC V. United States Forest Service 
Regarding the standard of review, ONRC recognized that while an agency action 
is presumptively valid and that substantial deference is afforded to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations, the court should not defer to an agency interpretation 
that contradicts the plain language of a regulation/®^ In this case, as in Martin, Glickman, 
and Peterson I, the monitoring requirements in the plan were found to be plain and 
unambiguous, and the agencies’ failures to follow them were held unlawful/®’
£. Conclusion
Though review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is often viewed as 
fatal, per se, to plaintiffs claims, the cases above demonstrate that the standard does have 
teeth and can overturn an agency decision that conflicts with its statutory mandate. Such 
is the case with regards to monitoring requirements. The better reasoned cases hold that
Id.
Peterson /, 185 F.3d at 368. 
Peterson II, 228 F.3d at 570.
Id. at 1090(citing Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). 
Id.
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the plain language of section 219.19, especially when read in the context of other 219 
regulations, NFMA and the purpose of the statute, requires that actual population data be 
collected. Without it, the Forest Service will not be able to determine the actual effects of 
its management activities on resident wildlife.
On the other hand, courts that have deferred to Forest Service claims that habitat 
viability analysis serves the same purpose and is allowed under the regulations, ignore the 
requirement of the hard look doctrine that an agency have a reasonable factual basis for 
its determinations. In the cases that allow habitat viability analysis, the Agency does not 
supply and the court does not require support for the Service’s assertions. Indeed, 
Glickman suggests this is because the Forest Service itself recognizes that habitat 
viability analysis was not intended or effective as a substitute for gathering actual 
population data. The often criticized concept of MIS is itself a rather large assumption, to 
stack an even larger assumption, habitat viability analysis, on top of that, renders 
decisions made with these tools highly speculative at best.
V. Conclusion
The success o f judicial challenges attempting to force the Forest Service to 
adequately perform the species surveying and monitoring requirements contained in 
federal envirorunental laws, regulations and individual forest plans has been inconsistent, 
but the better reasoned cases have surmounted the two primary barriers to judicial 
enforcement of monitoring requirements.
First, Martin, Peterson I  and OA%C rightly recognize the judicial doctrine of 
ripeness and the associated requirement of final agency action are satisfied when agencies 
ignore procedural information gathering steps intended to guide their decisions.
However, these opinions still fail to recognize that site-specific allegations, intended to
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demonstrate harm to the court, are unnecessary when the injury is to a procedural right. 
This is especially true in the case of a failure to monitor, which should impact decisions 
throughout the plamiing area. Agency noncompliance with species monitoring 
requirements is ripe for judicial review as final agency actions or failures to act
Second, Martin, Glickman, Peterson I  and ONRC properly apply the standard of 
review, the concept of agency discretion, and the hard look doctrine. While these 
decisions recognize the degree to which a court must defer to a land management 
agency’s scientific expertise and its interpretation of its regulations, they require that 
agency decisions regarding scientific methods have some support and that an agency 
interpretation of its own regulations have a reasonable basis in the language and purpose 
of regulations. While an agency is entitled to deference in interpreting and carrying out 
these regulations, an agency’s failure to collect the required data is contrary to the law and 
renders arbitrary and capricious any decision based on inadequate data.
Though the success of the these challenges in federal courts has been inconsistent, 
judicial enforcement of monitoring requirements is legally and scientifically supportable, 
and remains a viable method to ensure that federal agencies make fully informed resource 
development decisions that consider and protect habitat, species, and biodiversity on our 
public lands. To this end, the agency must monitor both management indicator species 
numbers, and demographic rates, as well as habitat quantity and quality. Monitoring is 
required by NFMA and its attendant regulations, and this requirement should be enforced 
by courts.
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